{ "export": { "source": "https://urth.darkrealm.vip/thread/urth/1274", "note": "Exported from an unofficial mirror of a public mailing list. Copyright in each message remains with the person who wrote it. Email addresses are obscured as `user at host`, the form the original archive published. This file was rebuilt from parsed fields rather than retained headers, so it is faithful in content but not byte-exact.", "addresses": "obscured as 'user at host'" }, "archive": "urth", "thread": { "id": 1274, "subject": "War and Sense", "messages": 3, "voices": 3, "first": "1998-11-25T00:45:00+00:00", "last": "1998-11-25T21:57:49+00:00" }, "messages": [ { "message_id": "", "from": { "name": "m.driussi", "address": "m.driussi at genie.com" }, "date": "1998-11-25T00:45:00+00:00", "subject": "(urth) War and Sense", "in_reply_to": null, "reply_link": null, "blocks": [ { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Paul,\n\nThis seems the time for my recent thoughts on the \"absurdity\" of\ncertain units at the battle front. I know this is something you keep\nturning over, the tallman riding dwarfs, the daughters of war, and so\non.\n\nI think we all agree that they are surreal, at least, and that there\nare such weird units on the friendly side as well as the enemy side\njust adds to the dream-like quality.\n\nBeyond that level: While I don't want to argue that tallmen units\n\"make sense\" (i.e., I don't have any new insight as to how they would\nwork, let alone work out), even in the sense of \"put mx missiles in\nfiberglass sailing boats\" (an idea floated in CASTLE OF THE OTTER, I\nthink), I do want to put a bit of question into the underlying idea\nthat warfare is always rational, especially when there are new\ntechnologies introduced, and/or mixtures of wildly different groups.\n\nWitness the massed charges in WWI trench warfare. Why on Earth did\nit have to happen more than =once=? As predictable as feeding men\ninto a sausage grinder, making them run across open ground toward\nfixed machine guns. And yet the generals kept ordering them.\nSenseless and un-learning of mistakes.\n\nSayings like \"armies are always prepared to fight the previous war\"\nremind us that each new conflict (especially true in the modern age)\ninvolves a lot of untried tools and techniques. The French thought\nthey'd built an invincible wall; the Germans just went around it. If\nstressed ice battleships had saved the Allies during WWII, their\nplans would be enshrined; if the atomic bomb failed to work, it would\nhave been yet another kooky pipedream. But just because the tool\nbecomes enshrined doesn't mean that it will be adequate or\nappropriate for the next conflict, and yet it will still show up as\n\"old trusty, the one thing we can count on\" when the new conflict\nstarts.\n\nSo. My point being that these weird units serve to highlight the\nsenselessness. Honor guards, marine bands, even the Salvation Army\nout there battling it to the death, while giant shirukens and martian\ntripods play \"Stars (pentadactyls) and Stripes (tripod flame beams)\nForever.\"\n\nWe know that the Daughters of War are an important cultural thing for\ntheir people. We see an earlier stage of the same process happening\nwith the semi-naked horseback riders (Tarentine?)--each one who\nsurvives is convinced that his personal magic chant was the key.\nPresumably the tallman riders developed as a response to some other\nconflict, somewhere else, somewhen else, under conditions where it\nmight have somehow made sense. (I'm reminded of Vaughn Bode's robot\nseries, the early history of which has a German unicycle bot of 1911\nthat went amok in a lightning storm and was finally defeated by a\nfarmer with a pitchfork--a statue stands in his honor.)\n\n=mantis=" } ] }, { "message_id": "", "from": { "name": "Peter Stephenson", "address": "pws at ibmth.df.unipi.it" }, "date": "1998-11-25T09:21:10+00:00", "subject": "Re: (urth) War and Sense", "in_reply_to": "", "reply_link": "subject", "blocks": [ { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "m.driussi at genie.com wrote:\nWitness the massed charges in WWI trench warfare. Why on Earth did\nit have to happen more than =once=? As predictable as feeding men\ninto a sausage grinder, making them run across open ground toward\nfixed machine guns. And yet the generals kept ordering them.\nSenseless and un-learning of mistakes." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Haig's theory was that the Germans were suffering more by this, and\nthe only way to win the war was by attrition. Maybe he just\nsubtracted the population of the Central Powers from those of the\nAllies to see who would be left standing (think of all those gallant\nnatives from the Empire, delighted to be slaughtered for Britain).\nYou have to add lots of other things before it begins to become\nbelievable. For example, he may have thought that if they got bogged\ndown in a passive, rather than an active, stalemate, it would give the\nGermans time to come up with a Secret Weapon (TM), or something. In\nany case, he was not living in the world he thought he was living in.\n\nThere's an important difference between the Commonwealth/Ascian war\nand most wars, although I'm not sure it's got much to do with unusual\nunits. Most modern wars change through technological progress, such\nas tanks and related developments in 1917--18 which (unexpectedly,\nneedless to say) altered the face of the war. In the case of Urth,\nthe technology is going the other way; the more powerful weapons are\nrelics of an earlier age. It's bound to change the picture a bit.\n\ncorncrake" }, { "kind": "sig", "depth": 0, "text": "Peter Stephenson Tel: +39 050 844536\nWWW: http://www.ifh.de/~pws/\nDipartimento di Fisica, Via Buonarroti 2, 56100 Pisa, Italy" } ] }, { "message_id": "", "from": { "name": "Peter T. Cash", "address": "ptcash at ibm.net" }, "date": "1998-11-25T21:57:49+00:00", "subject": "(urth) War and sense", "in_reply_to": "", "reply_link": "subject", "blocks": [ { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "From: Paul C Duggan \nAnd the Ascian \"roll to see how many of your troops commit suicide before\nthe battle\" beats GW's Commissar kills Seargent to prevent squad from\nrouting for \"dark and gothic\" ruleswriting." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Careful, the Sergeant is sensitive to proposals involving fragging of\nnoncoms; they undermine discipline. He does not recall Mr. Wolfe suggesting\nanything like this, but he will investigate. Mr. Wolfe may have to do some\npush-ups.\n\nKind of reminds me of the (probably apocryphal) comment attributed to a\nRussian general in the Winter War against the Finns upon greeting a\ntrainload of replacements: \"Shall we march them up to the front...or just\nshoot them here?\" I'm sure he was purged by the commisars." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "From: m.driussi at genie.com" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Witness the massed charges in WWI trench warfare. Why on Earth did\nit have to happen more than =once=? As predictable as feeding men\ninto a sausage grinder, making them run across open ground toward\nfixed machine guns. And yet the generals kept ordering them.\nSenseless and un-learning of mistakes." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Well, there was a problem you see: the generals thought it was important to\nwin the war, and they couldn't think of anything to do, except charge the\nenemy lines. Haig and French et. al. knew very well what happens when you\ncharge entrenchments held by machine guns. (Indeed, French at least had some\npretty bitter experience just charging entrenchments manned by guys with\nrepeating bolt-action Mausers during the Boer War). But you're seeing the\npast through the eyes of today; they thought differently in 1915 than we do\nnow: the generals on both sides simply did not consider massive casualties\nan unacceptable price for victory--and neither did the public. Our thinking\nhas changed since that time, partially as a reaction to the slaughter of\nboth world wars.\n\nWe may have gone to an extreme. Today's US army will do almost anything to\navoid casualties; indeed, that army is notorious for its expenditure of\nfirepower (mostly air and artillery) over risking a frontal attack against a\nprepared enemy; this policy is quite heedless of civilian \"collateral\ncasualties\". The problem with such doctrine is that there may come a time\nwhen sacrifices must be made, when there is nothing to do but assault enemy\npositions with whatever resources are at hand. And that means a lot of\ncasualties. The Marines might still be able to do this; the Army...no. Well,\nperhaps we'll be lucky; maybe the world has become a better place since 1918\nand there'll be no more serious warfare involving the major Powers. No, I'm\nnot betting on it.\n\nSgt. Rock" } ] } ] }