{ "export": { "source": "https://urth.darkrealm.vip/thread/urth/4259", "note": "Exported from an unofficial mirror of a public mailing list. Copyright in each message remains with the person who wrote it. Email addresses are obscured as `user at host`, the form the original archive published. This file was rebuilt from parsed fields rather than retained headers, so it is faithful in content but not byte-exact.", "addresses": "obscured as 'user at host'" }, "archive": "urth", "thread": { "id": 4259, "subject": "just in case anyone was wondering", "messages": 9, "voices": 6, "first": "2004-12-01T22:02:15+00:00", "last": "2004-12-05T13:51:31+00:00" }, "messages": [ { "message_id": "<20041202060211.CB82D3950@sitemail.everyone.net>", "from": { "name": "turin", "address": "turin at hell.com" }, "date": "2004-12-01T22:02:15+00:00", "subject": "(urth) just in case anyone was wondering", "in_reply_to": null, "reply_link": null, "blocks": [ { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "just in case anyone was wondering\n\nMy favorite Lewis is Till We Have Faces. After that it is That Hideous Strength. Crush gave a good critique of the book, but I just wanted to point out that Lewis was a member of the Order of the Golden Dawn for a while and denounced it but used the idea of Planetary Intelligences for his Greek God/Angel Ossyra or however you spell them. I mean it's inherently Cabbalistic.\n\nDoes anyone consider the Sun series one novel? I mean, it's one history, but is it one novel? I definitely agree with everyone's ideas about gnosticism, but the idea of secret knowledge is a strange contradiction in Christian mythology on the part of the Church. If there is something you don't know, of course it's secret. If God is unknown or unknowable, of course he's secret too. Really, what the Chruch is saying is that we have it all here, the manual for the universe with this Bible and this catachism, you're set, just believe in Christ and go to confession, never mind spiritual growth We don't even need revelation or prophecy anymore. And then people wonder why Evangelicism started in America, born out of Protestantism which was as mechanistic as Newton's physics. This is also why Eastern religions are now popular in america. People want to undergo transformed. All the Church offers the Christian is the transformations of death and the resurrection but none for the life between now and death. It seems with the advent of modern psychology Christian churchs at least in America have changed their tune to a certain degree, there is a 12 step self help program for everything, but for a long time Protestanism was admit your a sinner, believe in Christ, and before that, not even those simple coercions were a gurantee. The moment you remove ritual, culture, and history is the moment you lose relevance. \n\nI want to throw out some questions we've been talking about but turn them on Wolfe. I usually read books without thinking of what the author believes, but in the case of Wolfe and Tolkien, it's kind of neccesary, and also I want to know what Wolfe thinks as a reader of his own work not as an author trying to communicate a specific message.\n\nI wonder what Wolfe actually thinks about the gnosticism in his novels? Do you think Wolfe believes Silke's enlightenment could happen? Do you think he believes personalities can be copied, like Hans Moravec or Kurzweil, scanned into a computer, does he equate the mind with the soul like Descrates? And does he think the chems, Maytera Marble, Hammerstone, or Counselor Loris, Lemur, etc are people (Even if the bodies of counsel have died)? Do the inhumi have souls or are they in the process of gaining souls? Would that mean for Wolfe that Jonas had a soul? The elves in the Wizard Knight don't have souls, but he implies that they will could recieve souls, but this is a convention of faerie stories, the soulless elves. He also talks about Baby and Seawrack both becoming people. Does language consittute personhood for Wolfe? Do you need to be a person to have a soul? " } ] }, { "message_id": "<033501c4d839$6a06e9f0$4c1e4b0a@vcorp.ad.vrsn.com>", "from": { "name": "James Wynn", "address": "thewynns at earthlink.net" }, "date": "2004-12-01T22:37:45+00:00", "subject": "(urth) On Christian Principles OT", "in_reply_to": "<20041202060211.CB82D3950@sitemail.everyone.net>", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Really, what the Chruch is saying is that we have it all here,\nthe manual for the universe with this Bible and this catachism,\nyou're set, just believe in Christ and go to confession, never\nmind spiritual growth." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "I don't think the New Testament, the Eastern Orthodox, the RCC, or any\nProtestant demononation teaches that. It is no easy lifelong task to \"die\ndaily\" or to \"put on the whole armor of God\". One might as well say that the\npurpose of a wedding is to set aside the work of a marriage." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "We don't even need revelation or prophecy anymore." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "The Charismatic segments of Christianity (most are Evangelical) hold\ncontemporary revelation as very central to their worship experience and are\nvery open to prophecy (in the sense of revelation of the future). All\nChristian traditions hold prophecy in the sense of \"professing God's Word\"\nto be key to their worship. However, to my knowledge, only the LDS believe\nthat contemporary revelation/prophesy can overwrite the Scriptural canon." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "And then people wonder why Evangelicism started in America,\nborn out of Protestantism which was as mechanistic as Newton's\nphysics. This is also why Eastern religions are now popular in america.\nPeople want to undergo transform[ation]. All the Church offers the\nChristian is the transformations of death and the resurrection but none\nfor the life between now and death." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Christian conversion is expected to be transformative.\nAsk any convict who was \"saved\" in prison." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "It seems with the advent of modern psychology Christian churchs\nat least in America have changed their tune to a certain degree,\nthere is a 12 step self help program for everything, but for a long\ntime Protestanism was admit your a sinner, believe in Christ, and\nbefore that, not even those simple coercions were a gurantee. The\nmoment you remove ritual, culture, and history is the moment you\nlose relevance." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "I think it was the 12 step program that adopted the conventions of\nChristianity (with it's emphasis on 'giving your testimony'). I'm not\ncertain what Luther would say about \"falling from Grace\" but obviously\nCalvin's teaching declared the very idea absurd.\n\n~ Crush" } ] }, { "message_id": "<033e01c4d840$976c4be0$4c1e4b0a@vcorp.ad.vrsn.com>", "from": { "name": "James Wynn", "address": "thewynns at earthlink.net" }, "date": "2004-12-01T23:29:02+00:00", "subject": "(urth) just in case anyone was wondering", "in_reply_to": "<20041202060211.CB82D3950@sitemail.everyone.net>", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "My favorite Lewis is Till We Have Faces. After that it is That Hideous\nStrength." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Having read just about everything Lewis wrote, I can confidently assert that\nhis *fiction* is the most compelling. Even \"Pilgrim's Regress\". That moment\nwhere the protagonists discovers \"well, maybe there is no Landlord, but\nthere definitely is a Pit because I'm in it!\" was really stirring to me. I\ndidn't know anything about the Order of the Golden Dawn. I'll have to check\nit out." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Does anyone consider the Sun series one novel?\nI mean, it's one history, but is it one novel?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "There are certain portions of \"The Long Sun\" that I don't think are\ncomprehensible until you've read \"The Short Sun\". The inhumi are obviously\none aspect, but IMO Pike's ghost is another. Wolfe's choice in making Horn\nthe primary narrator of the LS and his mimicking Silk are a couple others." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "I wonder what Wolfe actually thinks about the gnosticism in his novels?" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Do you think Wolfe believes Silke's enlightenment could happen?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Silk's enlightenment with the world freezing in time is a recreation of\nJoseph's experience in the apocraphal Gospel of James at the moment of\nJesus' birth. Do I think Wolfe believes God talks to people? absolutely." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "I wonder what Wolfe actually thinks about the gnosticism in his novels?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Good question. Based on his other apparent beliefs, he's no Gnostic. But he\nsure dips his characters and stories in the Gnostic river pretty frequently" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Do you think he believes personalities can be copied, like\nHans Moravec or Kurzweil, scanned into a computer, does\nhe equate the mind with the soul like Descrates?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "I almost sent a post about this today to something someone said, but I\ndecided not to. Well....\n\nI once asked him about the fact that Identity is a frequent subject of his\nnovels and he said:\n\n\"I think that identity and memory are the fascinating\nthemes of life. That and our relationship with God. These are the major,\nmajor themes through[out] fiction and myth. I'm sure if we could trace back\nfar enough we'd find they are inherant in the huiman condition. It would be\ninteresting to know if they are equally important to an alien race. We can\nspeculate but we can't answer that.\"\n\nAt the time I took that to mean that Wolfe considered memory and identity\ntobe something of the same thing. And there is a sense in which Wolfe seems\nto be a Christian Rationalist and has reason to doubt whether Wolfe thinks\nhe *himself* will go to Heaven or whether his memories and personality will\nbe *uploaded* there or perhaps that he thinks the idea of a body and soul\nbeing separated is inconcievable. I don't think he believes the latter two\nand I'll tell you why:\n\n1) Rose-as-Marble says that \"now I'm one of those gold doo-dads on those\ncards, but I'm still a person because I always was\". This tells me that\nWolfe considers a soul to be transcendent over matter. Rose is a person in\nMarble because she was a person originally. Conversely, if you could\nreconstruct a soul from scratch, identical in every way to a model, it would\nstill only be a facsimile of a soul rather than an actual one because a soul\nis God-made. Humans can't make a soul from scratch.\n\n2) The Short Sun Narrator tells that story of a man who leaves a house and\ncompares it to the soul leaving a body. He says, \"the body doesn't die\nbecause the soul leaves. The soul leaves because the body dies and is no\nlonger useful to it.\" (paraphrasing)\nOnce again, this shows an opinion that the soul is trancendent to the body.\n\n3) In The Wizard, Able differentiates between Gylf whose soul is part of his\nnature and Mani whose soul is an elemental being. Mani's identity is a\nmixture of the cat and the elemental. When the cat dies and the elemental\nleaves, Mani will cease to exist although the elemental will live on.\nGylf's soul is of another nature and the only I model I can think of that is\nthe classical body and soul." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "And does he think the chems, Maytera Marble, Hammerstone, or Counselor\nLoris, Lemur, etc are people (Even if the bodies of counsel have died)?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "For purposes of the story, I think it is clear they are. For how this can be\nconsidering all I just said, I have an explanation. I've said it here before\nbut here goes:\n\nThe reason the Ayuntamiento could so easily rig chems to receive their\npersonalities was because chems were designed to do just that. Chems were\ndownloaded with the scans of real live people. A single person could ensoul\nany number of chems in this way. I believe that possibly all the female\nchems were ensouled by Kypris and all the male chems were ensouled by\nPas/Typhon. But it is possible that there are other people behind those\nfaceplates. Considering what Rose-in-Marble says, that is the only way I can\njustify the chems being persons.\nGranted not everyone (or anyone) agrees with me on this." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Do the inhumi have souls or are they in the process of gaining souls?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "They have souls. And look here! Here's another example of souls being split\noff from a donor." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Would that mean for Wolfe that Jonas had a soul?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "How else could he be in Miles?" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "The elves in the Wizard Knight don't have souls, but he implies that they\nwill could recieve souls, but" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "this is a convention of faerie stories, the soulless elves.\n\nNo comment." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "He also talks about Babbie and Seawrack both becoming people." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "If only we understood more about Seawrack." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Does language consittute personhood for Wolfe?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "What makes you ask that?" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Do you need to be a person to have a soul?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "I presume. As in what?\n\nThis makes me think of the vison of the island the protagonist has in\n\"Pilgrims Regress\" where he sees Nierads \"wise as gods, but soulless like\nbeasts\"\n\n~ Crush" } ] }, { "message_id": "", "from": { "name": "Chris", "address": "rasputin_ at hotmail.com" }, "date": "2004-12-02T18:43:06+00:00", "subject": "(urth) just in case anyone was wondering", "in_reply_to": "<033e01c4d840$976c4be0$4c1e4b0a@vcorp.ad.vrsn.com>", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Crush said:" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "At the time I took that to mean that Wolfe considered memory and identity\ntobe something of the same thing. And there is a sense in which Wolfe seems\nto be a Christian Rationalist and has reason to doubt whether Wolfe thinks\nhe *himself* will go to Heaven or whether his memories and personality will\nbe *uploaded* there or perhaps that he thinks the idea of a body and soul\nbeing separated is inconcievable. I don't think he believes the latter two\nand I'll tell you why:" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Well, before going further I tend to think that attempts to look for Wolfe's \npersonal beliefs on these particular subjects through the books are doomed \nto failure. The questions Wolfe is raising are difficult - many would say \nimpossible - to answer rationally. (There is always faith, but faith can't \nbe communicated). Wolfe knows this, and I think he understands that any \nattempt to actually *answer* them in his books would fatally flaw the text. \nI think that Wolfe's goal is not to answer these questions but to put them \nin front of you in a vivid way and force you to confront the inherent \nparadoxes.\n\nIf this is the case then I would expect him to be especially careful in \nlaying out the problem so that it's not skewed by his own bias. He doesn't \nwant the reader to just follow him along for the ride, so if anything I'd \nexpect a bias *against* his own point of view in the text... but, that said, \nI haven't seen such a bias." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "1) Rose-as-Marble says that \"now I'm one of those gold doo-dads on those\ncards, but I'm still a person because I always was\". This tells me that\nWolfe considers a soul to be transcendent over matter. Rose is a person in\nMarble because she was a person originally." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "But, going beyond the surface of the words, you're still left with a problem \nhere - are the words the product of a soul/person perceiving its own nature, \nor are they the product of a program, a \"simulation\" of sorts? On the one \nhand you can compare it to Searle's \"Chinese Room\" (in which case language \ncomes into play, peripherally, again) - as an outside observer you can't \ntell if the words you're seeing \"mean\" what they think they do, or whether \nthey \"mean\" anything at all as opposed to being the product of a mere \nmechanical process.\n\nOn a more personal level looking at it from the assumed perspective of Rose, \nthe \"gold doo-dads on those cards\" believe themselves to be a person - can \nthey believe otherwise? - but the only answer available as to why is \n\"because I always was\". When it comes down to it do we have any better \nreason ourselves? You could just as easily argue that Wolfe is implying that \nthere are no souls, either for Rose-in-Marble or for ourselves. I won't make \nthat argument, because I don't think he was actually arguing for either \npoint of view.\n\nI also find the situation complicated, because personally I was never sure \nthat Rose was really in there any more than I could be sure that Thecla was \n\"really\" in Severian. The two are actually pretty close to the same case." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "2) The Short Sun Narrator tells that story of a man who leaves a house and\ncompares it to the soul leaving a body. He says, \"the body doesn't die\nbecause the soul leaves. The soul leaves because the body dies and is no\nlonger useful to it.\" (paraphrasing)\nOnce again, this shows an opinion that the soul is trancendent to the body." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "But whose opinion? Silk and Horn have opinions that are distinct from Wolfe, \nand we often learn that Wolfe's narrators aren't always right - nor are they \nmouthpieces for Wolfe's own opinion." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "And does he think the chems, Maytera Marble, Hammerstone, or Counselor\nLoris, Lemur, etc are people (Even if the bodies of counsel have died)?" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "For purposes of the story, I think it is clear they are. For how this can \nbe\nconsidering all I just said, I have an explanation. I've said it here \nbefore\nbut here goes:\n\nThe reason the Ayuntamiento could so easily rig chems to receive their\npersonalities was because chems were designed to do just that. Chems were\ndownloaded with the scans of real live people. A single person could ensoul\nany number of chems in this way. I believe that possibly all the female\nchems were ensouled by Kypris and all the male chems were ensouled by\nPas/Typhon. But it is possible that there are other people behind those\nfaceplates. Considering what Rose-in-Marble says, that is the only way I \ncan\njustify the chems being persons.\nGranted not everyone (or anyone) agrees with me on this." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "I agree with you that part of the original design of the chems *must* have \nbeen to accept the imprint of personalities. Possibly to give Pas & co. a \nset of convenient (and strong) receptacles at need. I am not sure about your \nconclusion, though - what about chem reproduction? This could be a serious \ntheological problem from Wolfe's perspective. (Bonus question: is natural \nreproduction really any less of a theological problem, and if so or if not, \nwhat does this say about the nature of the soul?)\n\nAn interesting side thread to that entire issue is the theme which recurs \nrepeatedly about imitation. Someone asks Silk what would happen if a demon \ntried to impersonate a god. A parallel question would then be, what if an AI \ntries to impersonate a soul? Does Silk's answer to that question hold up for \neither case?" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "Do the inhumi have souls or are they in the process of gaining souls?" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "They have souls. And look here! Here's another example of souls being split\noff from a donor." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "There is something peculiar about inhumi souls, however. They seem to have \nonly half of what they need, and the half they have is \npassive/impressionable/reactive, what some might call the \"animal soul\". The \nsouls of the inhumi, and the Neighbors, present one of the biggest puzzles \nof the BotSS I think.\n\nChris (Civet)" } ] }, { "message_id": "<1f76173704120308307bd2466@mail.gmail.com>", "from": { "name": "Dan'l Danehy-Oakes", "address": "danldo at gmail.com" }, "date": "2004-12-03T08:30:29+00:00", "subject": "(urth) just in case anyone was wondering", "in_reply_to": "", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "In something of a hurry but to reply to one part of Chris's and James's \ndiscussion - yes, only the Increate can make a soul or ensoul a being,\nbut this does not mean that an artifical being is necessarily soulless -\nif we were to create a device capable of serving as the embodiment of\na soul, there is no particular reason to suppose that the Increate would\n_not_ ensoul it. This is a bit of a slipperyslope argument that begins with\nnormal births and identical twins, moves to clones, from there to \ngenetically manipulated embryos, and so on; there seems to be no\nsingle particular line you can draw and say with certainty, \"God will\ngrant _this_ a soul, but not _that_,\" where \"this\" and \"that\" are two\nconsecutive stages on the slope. (Well, I suppose an argument could \nbe made for \"the point at which there is no neurobiological component\nat all.\")\n\nHurriedly,\n\n--Dan'l" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "On Fri, 03 Dec 2004 02:42:21 +0000, Chris wrote:\nCrush said:" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "At the time I took that to mean that Wolfe considered memory and identity\ntobe something of the same thing. And there is a sense in which Wolfe seems\nto be a Christian Rationalist and has reason to doubt whether Wolfe thinks\nhe *himself* will go to Heaven or whether his memories and personality will\nbe *uploaded* there or perhaps that he thinks the idea of a body and soul\nbeing separated is inconcievable. I don't think he believes the latter two\nand I'll tell you why:" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Well, before going further I tend to think that attempts to look for Wolfe's\npersonal beliefs on these particular subjects through the books are doomed\nto failure. The questions Wolfe is raising are difficult - many would say\nimpossible - to answer rationally. (There is always faith, but faith can't\nbe communicated). Wolfe knows this, and I think he understands that any\nattempt to actually *answer* them in his books would fatally flaw the text.\nI think that Wolfe's goal is not to answer these questions but to put them\nin front of you in a vivid way and force you to confront the inherent\nparadoxes.\n\nIf this is the case then I would expect him to be especially careful in\nlaying out the problem so that it's not skewed by his own bias. He doesn't\nwant the reader to just follow him along for the ride, so if anything I'd\nexpect a bias *against* his own point of view in the text... but, that said,\nI haven't seen such a bias." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "1) Rose-as-Marble says that \"now I'm one of those gold doo-dads on those\ncards, but I'm still a person because I always was\". This tells me that\nWolfe considers a soul to be transcendent over matter. Rose is a person in\nMarble because she was a person originally." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "But, going beyond the surface of the words, you're still left with a problem\nhere - are the words the product of a soul/person perceiving its own nature,\nor are they the product of a program, a \"simulation\" of sorts? On the one\nhand you can compare it to Searle's \"Chinese Room\" (in which case language\ncomes into play, peripherally, again) - as an outside observer you can't\ntell if the words you're seeing \"mean\" what they think they do, or whether\nthey \"mean\" anything at all as opposed to being the product of a mere\nmechanical process.\n\nOn a more personal level looking at it from the assumed perspective of Rose,\nthe \"gold doo-dads on those cards\" believe themselves to be a person - can\nthey believe otherwise? - but the only answer available as to why is\n\"because I always was\". When it comes down to it do we have any better\nreason ourselves? You could just as easily argue that Wolfe is implying that\nthere are no souls, either for Rose-in-Marble or for ourselves. I won't make\nthat argument, because I don't think he was actually arguing for either\npoint of view.\n\nI also find the situation complicated, because personally I was never sure\nthat Rose was really in there any more than I could be sure that Thecla was\n\"really\" in Severian. The two are actually pretty close to the same case." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "2) The Short Sun Narrator tells that story of a man who leaves a house and\ncompares it to the soul leaving a body. He says, \"the body doesn't die\nbecause the soul leaves. The soul leaves because the body dies and is no\nlonger useful to it.\" (paraphrasing)\nOnce again, this shows an opinion that the soul is trancendent to the body." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "But whose opinion? Silk and Horn have opinions that are distinct from Wolfe,\nand we often learn that Wolfe's narrators aren't always right - nor are they\nmouthpieces for Wolfe's own opinion." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 3, "text": "And does he think the chems, Maytera Marble, Hammerstone, or Counselor\nLoris, Lemur, etc are people (Even if the bodies of counsel have died)?" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "For purposes of the story, I think it is clear they are. For how this can\nbe\nconsidering all I just said, I have an explanation. I've said it here\nbefore\nbut here goes:\n\nThe reason the Ayuntamiento could so easily rig chems to receive their\npersonalities was because chems were designed to do just that. Chems were\ndownloaded with the scans of real live people. A single person could ensoul\nany number of chems in this way. I believe that possibly all the female\nchems were ensouled by Kypris and all the male chems were ensouled by\nPas/Typhon. But it is possible that there are other people behind those\nfaceplates. Considering what Rose-in-Marble says, that is the only way I\ncan\njustify the chems being persons.\nGranted not everyone (or anyone) agrees with me on this." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "I agree with you that part of the original design of the chems *must* have\nbeen to accept the imprint of personalities. Possibly to give Pas & co. a\nset of convenient (and strong) receptacles at need. I am not sure about your\nconclusion, though - what about chem reproduction? This could be a serious\ntheological problem from Wolfe's perspective. (Bonus question: is natural\nreproduction really any less of a theological problem, and if so or if not,\nwhat does this say about the nature of the soul?)\n\nAn interesting side thread to that entire issue is the theme which recurs\nrepeatedly about imitation. Someone asks Silk what would happen if a demon\ntried to impersonate a god. A parallel question would then be, what if an AI\ntries to impersonate a soul? Does Silk's answer to that question hold up for\neither case?" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 3, "text": "Do the inhumi have souls or are they in the process of gaining souls?" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "They have souls. And look here! Here's another example of souls being split\noff from a donor." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "There is something peculiar about inhumi souls, however. They seem to have\nonly half of what they need, and the half they have is\npassive/impressionable/reactive, what some might call the \"animal soul\". The\nsouls of the inhumi, and the Neighbors, present one of the biggest puzzles\nof the BotSS I think.\n\nChris (Civet)\n\n\n\n\n_______________________________________________" } ] }, { "message_id": "<004e01c4d9a4$edb14c20$4c1e4b0a@vcorp.ad.vrsn.com>", "from": { "name": "James Wynn", "address": "thewynns at earthlink.net" }, "date": "2004-12-03T17:59:49+00:00", "subject": "(urth) just in case anyone was wondering", "in_reply_to": "", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Phrases marked \">>\" were mine.\n\nCivit said:" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Well, before going further I tend to think that attempts to look for\nWolfe's\npersonal beliefs on these particular subjects through the books are doomed\nto failure. The questions Wolfe is raising are difficult - many would say\nimpossible - to answer rationally. (There is always faith, but faith can't\nbe communicated). Wolfe knows this, and I think he understands that any\nattempt to actually *answer* them in his books would fatally flaw the\ntext.\nI think that Wolfe's goal is not to answer these questions but to put them\nin front of you in a vivid way and force you to confront the inherent\nparadoxes." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Maybe. But I would be very surprised to learn that the argument that Silk\ngives for not disarming Viron does not map to Wolfe's own opinions regarding\ngun-control?\n\nBy the same token, Wolfe has Rose-in-Marble explain why she is a person and\nnot a machine-generate anomaly. Note that soul in the original Rose has\n\"gone to Mainframe\" or Heaven or wherever souls \"really\" go in the Long Sun\nuniverse. It seems likely to me that Wolfe has put into her mouth an\nargument that he sees as valid...in this case." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "1) Rose-as-Marble says that \"now I'm one of those gold doo-dads on those\ncards, but I'm still a person because I always was\". This tells me that\nWolfe considers a soul to be transcendent over matter. Rose is a person\nin\nMarble because she was a person originally." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Yes but is Rose's soul absent or present. If for Wolfe, the soul is an\nobject either\ninside or outside of time. If it is merely Rose's personality, than a\nperson is\ncognition of sufficient complexity and self recursion, with or without a\nsoul.\nYes, but Wolfe is saying you can copy/reconstruct a persona, a mind, not a\nsoul.\nIt doesn't make sense to say an exact copy of a piece of information is a\nfascimile.\nInformation is not a material object. If the soul is an energetic entity\nas opposed\nto an informational one, then that is different, but I don't know if he\nsays that anywhere." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "A physicist will tell you different. The piece of paper is far more\nintracately detailed information than the words written on it but it is\ninformation as well. It seems to me that Rose is not jus talking about her\nfeelings. She seems to have been considering the matter and believes she is\na person based logic. Granted: based on logic that is based on premises that\none can accept or reject. Still, its seems to me that those premises are\nbeing leaked by the author. I know Wolfe frequently has very wise characters\nsay things he believes and even shows to be false. This seems different.\n\nCivit replied" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "But, going beyond the surface of the words, you're still left with a\nproblem\nhere - are the words the product of a soul/person perceiving its own\nnature,\nor are they the product of a program, a \"simulation\" of sorts?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "That's what I'm trying to say. Wolfe's general story-telling from Fifth\nHead, Latro, and the Sun cycle could legitimately lead one to think that\nWolfe sees the soul as pure information. But a few key statements in LS and\nSS and now The Wizard Knight lead me to believe that Wolfe probably\n*actually* considers the soul to be *somehow* transcendent* of matter. If\nthe soul were not transcendent to the medium then the soul would not\ntypically \"leave the body\" when it was no longer useful as the Narrator of\nthe SS says it does.\n\nNor would Gylf's death be significantly different from Mani's in that Mani's\nsoul would die when the cat does (because Mani is the merger of the\nelemental and the cat) but the elemental spirit would lilve on. It seems to\nme that Able was saying that \"Gylf's soul\" would not die with him because it\nwas ultimately created by the Most High God.\n\nWolfe seems to me to have rejected Turing's standard for a \"self-conscious\"\nmachine and accepted Searle's Chinese Room argument.\n\nBut if anyone were to apply the model of \"soul = information\" he could\nhardly be blamed. That model works for most that happens in a Wolfe novel.\n\nCivit says" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "You could just as easily argue that Wolfe is implying that\nthere are no souls, either for Rose-in-Marble or for ourselves. I won't\nmake\nthat argument, because I don't think he was actually arguing for either\npoint of view." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "I don't either, of course, and frankly I don't think that would be a very\naccurate reading even if we didn't have extra-textual reason to doubt it." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "for Wolfe, a mind is memory and that is the persona or identity. this\ndoesn't say what Wolfe thinks of the soul, and the way he treats the\nreinscription of Severian, not that he believes this, but the way he treats\nSeverian's multiple copies it is as if he is equating the soul with the\ninformation of the persona. In other words, I'm baffled, I do not know\nwhat Wolfe is trying to tell us about the relationship between the soul\nand how that relates to the mind-body problem if anything." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "I think Wolfe has a personal theory regarding the soul - that it is\ntranscendent of matter and time. He is deliberately constructing stories\nthat assault that theory to see if it continues to stand up.\n\nCivit asks" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "But [regarding the SS Narator] whose opinion? Silk and Horn\nhave opinions that are distinct from Wolfe,\nand we often learn that Wolfe's narrators aren't always right - nor are\nthey\nmouthpieces for Wolfe's own opinion." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "I agree. Obviously, I consider this one to be distinct from other opinions\nfor reasons that might not be impervious to critique. This, and\nRose-in-Marble's statement feel different to me.\n\nChris says" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "I agree with you that part of the original design of the chems *must* have\nbeen to accept the imprint of personalities. Possibly to give Pas & co. a\nset of convenient (and strong) receptacles at need. I am not sure about\nyour\nconclusion, though - what about chem reproduction? This could be a serious\ntheological problem from Wolfe's perspective. (Bonus question: is natural\nreproduction really any less of a theological problem, and if so or if\nnot,\nwhat does this say about the nature of the soul?)" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "You see, you've anticipated my response. I don't think chem reproduction is\na problem. An interesting question? Very. But not directly relevant. New\nchem personalities are an amalgum of their parents'.\n\nTurin asks\nWhen you say [made to be ensouled] does that mean a downloaded personality\nprompts God to endow the organism supporting the persona a soul or that it\nshares a soul with the organism with the original personality, Kypris or\nPas. In other words, is Hammerstone Pas? Does the soul constitute the\nidentity even if the personae are identical?\n\nYes. I believe that Hamerstone is Typhon (Pas is a similar but different\nmatter) without his memories. You see? Memories don't equal the soul, or\nelse what of the soul of the sleepers in the Whorl? Are they different\npersons after that? Frankly, I don't think it is coincidental that the\nfemale chems looked like Mamelta. And IMO this is the explanation of Silk\nrealizing that he and Sand are \"brothers\".\n\nBut a soul is related to memory. Hammerstone becomes (it seems) a very\ndifferent person from the fellow Severian met in the mountain.\n\nTurin originally said:" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 3, "text": "The elves in the Wizard Knight don't have souls, but he implies that they\nwill could recieve souls, but this is a convention of\nfaerie stories, the soulless elves." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "No comment." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "and Turin responded" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "This does relate to the A.I. debate only in that they have personalities\nand not souls, but as I have said before I don't trust the Wizard >Knight to\ninform the questions raised by the Sun books." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "I neglected to answer your original question because I felt to go far into\nit was a spoiler (and we've decided to to discuss The Wizard Knight until\nafter the New Year. However, a dog (normal ones, not like Gylf) have\npersonalities but (according to the book of Ecclesaiastes?) has no soul. So,\nyes, a soul I presume *could* be seen as separate from the personality which\nwe can agree changes over time anyway (i.e. a personality is mutable, a soul\nis not).\n\n\nCivit asks" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "An interesting side thread to that entire issue is the theme which recurs\nrepeatedly about imitation. Someone asks Silk what would happen if a demon\ntried to impersonate a god. A parallel question would then be, what if an\nAI\ntries to impersonate a soul? Does Silk's answer to that question hold up\nfor\neither case?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Hmmm...since I believe they have human souls, perhaps I'm not the one to\ntake that on. But remember that the Outsider says demon who pretends to be a\ngod will become a god ***in a way.**** Quetzal is a fiend who wants to bring\nthe people of Viron to Green to provide food for his species. He is\npretending to be a kindly old augur who is seeking the best for his people.\nHe ends up dying trying to lead them safely through the tunnels. So I don't\nknow about chems, but it sort of worked for Quetzal. And Horn mimicked Silk\nand eventually in a way became him.\n\nTurin speculates:" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "As for language, Seawrack says that Horn has made Baby and her people\nand if they go back to their previous environments they will no longer be\npeople. In this case, is personhood a kind of socialization or\ndomestication?\nBaby is learning how to communicate, and Seawrack is using whatever\nlanguage Horn is speaking. If Horn makes Seawrack a person, but she\nknew the Mother's language beforehand, it doesn't seem as if language\nmakes Seawrack a person. However, Baby did not know how to\ncommunicate before he met Horn, so is communication or rather conscious\nrepresentation, the basis of personhood, and if Baby was not a person, did\nhe have a soul?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Okay. First of all, I don't get Seawrack. It bugs me that Seawrack and\nHyacinth are so key and so obscure. In the case of Babbie, remember when\nthey all go Urth and Babbie looks like a guy with big arms and glasses? You\nprobably were here when I came to the positive conclusion about who was in\nBabbie....it was Silk (the only character in the books with glasses and\naccording to Remora \"by far the huskiest student the schola produced that\nyear\"). I think Babbie has mental communication with the people he is around\nand...I don't know the words but he sort of becomes them over time. So it\nisn't language that \"ensouls\" Babbie. It is a processes similar to how Rose\ngot into Marble and how Lemur became entrapped in a chem." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "In case of Seawrack, her fear of not being a person is\nsimilar to Dorcas believing she is a ghost, just as Silk is a reinscribed\nSeverian, so is Seawrack and Mamelta reinscriptions of Dorcas. I think\nWolfe believed that Seawrack was always a person, and I say that because\nI think Wolfe agrees with Severian that Dorcas is not a ghost, but that is\nmore intuition than anything and a kind of guessing on Wolfe's sentiment\ntowards Dorcas/Mamelta/Seawrack. I don't think he thinks language is\nneccesary for personhood, but I am not sure about representation.\nThis is a concept that cognitive science debates endlessly over, but one\nI think Wolfe is not unaware of or hasn't studied." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "The question once again is \"what does Wolfe consider a ghost?\" According to\nthe Narrator of the Short Sun they are all ghosts when they dream travel.\nWas Rose-in-Marble a ghost?\n\nTurin asks:" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Also, why is Oreb four feet tall in Horn's dreams?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Nathan answered this a bit, but Oreb at the time was the amalguma of Scylla\nand the bird, just as Mani is the amalgum of a cat and an elemental spirit." } ] }, { "message_id": "", "from": { "name": "Chris", "address": "rasputin_ at hotmail.com" }, "date": "2004-12-04T12:16:03+00:00", "subject": "(urth) just in case anyone was wondering", "in_reply_to": "<004e01c4d9a4$edb14c20$4c1e4b0a@vcorp.ad.vrsn.com>", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Crush said:" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Maybe. But I would be very surprised to learn that the argument that Silk\ngives for not disarming Viron does not map to Wolfe's own opinions \nregarding\ngun-control?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Quite possibly so. But the issue of gun control is also not so much a deep \nphilosophical problem, and Silk's concerns are quite practical - you can map \nthem to sets of applicable circumstances, I don't think they're meant as a \nuniversal law. I do see your point, though - I'll argue below that Wolfe did \nhave a point with these stories, but that his point wasn't so much whether \nor not chems have souls, or whether we can know they have souls." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "It seems to me that Rose is not jus talking about her\nfeelings. She seems to have been considering the matter and believes she is\na person based logic." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Well, Descartes tried this as well. This entire class of arguments has \nlogical problems that probably make them a dead end. But they do articulate \none of our most basic intuitions on the subject.\n\nMy take on this is that it is to show that \"Rose\" at least appears to be \nreflective about her existence, in a simple way, which will be important for \nother reasons." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "That's what I'm trying to say. Wolfe's general story-telling from Fifth\nHead, Latro, and the Sun cycle could legitimately lead one to think that\nWolfe sees the soul as pure information. But a few key statements in LS and\nSS and now The Wizard Knight lead me to believe that Wolfe probably\n*actually* considers the soul to be *somehow* transcendent* of matter." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "I'm going to diverge for a second to frame the dispute you've mentioned, \nbecause it's a real philosophical point of contention. I've seen it most \nclearly articulated in Parfit, but he seems to have been partially inspired \nby Proust (as was 5HoC, which you mentioned). Parfit says our intuitions \nwaffle between two views on identity, and that these views of identity have \ndifferent moral consequences, which tend to make our judgments somewhat \ninconsistent. He calls them the simple and the complex view - I don't think \nthese names are apt, but I'll use them anyway.\n\nThe complex view is like what you mentioned about pure information. Our \nidentity is the set of inclinations, aptitudes, goals, loves, and most \nimportantly *memories* we have. The intuition here is that if we lost all of \nthe above, we could say quite seriously that the person we were is dead, \njust as Proust talks about a succession of selves; further, when we \ncontemplate the future person we will become, who may care about \nsignificantly different things and may have forgotten some of our most \ncherished memories, etc, for us to wish to become that person seems a sort \nof suicidal impulse. So, with the complex view our identity is in a state of \nconstant flux, usually a little at a time.\n\nThe simple view is probably more intuitive, at least to me, and that is that \nidentity is really something outside all that, some essential connection \nwhich is continuous and makes you yourself even if you get some form of \nradical amnesia and start over from a blank slate. It is, as you say, \n\"somehow transcendent of matter\".\n\nLike our intuitions, I think Wolfe presents us with some cases where the \nsimple view seems more right somehow, and some where the complex seems \ncorrect. As a matter of fact you could probably take these cases and present \nthem as a series of thought problems on the subject. I think, from other \nstatements you've made, that you more or less agree on this point." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Wolfe seems to me to have rejected Turing's standard for a \"self-conscious\"\nmachine and accepted Searle's Chinese Room argument." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "I think on this one, though, you may have meant the opposite of what you \nsaid. I could be wrong, but I think if Wolfe accepted Searle's argument then \nhe would say that no chems have souls, period. Searle argues (in variously \nstronger or weaker forms) against the very possibility of AI. Turing, on the \nother hand, to use Turin's terms, seems to give up on the \"ontological\" \nproblem (whether AI's are \"really\" conscious or \"really\" have souls) and \ngoes for the \"epistemological\", saying - if I interpret the quote correctly \n- that if it LOOKS conscious then I'm going to say it IS conscious, and \nsince that's as close to the reality as we can get, let's say that we \"know\" \nit's conscious. This seems to go along somewhat with what you are saying \nabout Wolfe's opinion.\n\nI'm arguing that Wolfe doesn't seem to take a hard position on either of \nthose; his opinion is moral, rather than ontological or epistemological. \nThis ties in neatly with another thread of the conversation - Turin \ndifferentiated between having a soul and being a person at some point, I \nbelieve. I'm willing to expand on this at this point - \"having a soul\" is a \npossible property in reality, a statement about the real world. To know that \nsomething has a soul is to know something about what *is*. In the sense I'm \ntalking about here (not the sense used in Rose's quote), personhood is a \n*moral status* - a statement about how someone/something *ought* to be \ntreated. You can grant something personhood without granting it a soul, and \n(this is arguable, but not an argument we want to get into here) you can \ngrant a soul without granting personhood.\n\nSilk *treats* Rose-in-Marble as he would treat Rose, but this doesn't mean \nhe somehow knows Rose is in there. He can't know. In fact he seems troubled \nby some doubts if I recall correctly. But regardless, he grants her \npersonhood and treats her accordingly. This may seem just a sentimental \nstreak in Wolfe, or non-controversial, but in a way it's a substantial \nposition because it would grant moral rights to AI." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "You see, you've anticipated my response. I don't think chem reproduction is\na problem. An interesting question? Very. But not directly relevant. New\nchem personalities are an amalgum of their parents'." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Well, hold on. To say that chem \"personalities\" are from their parents says \nnothing about the \"soul\", unless you're taking the \"complex view\" I \nmentioned above. Actually I tend to agree with what you've said about \nWolfe's views on the soul, which accord more with the \"simple\" view (it's \njust that I don't think he's really pushing that view through the book). So, \nif we're saying that the original chems got their \"souls\" (as distinct from \nmere personality) from people, then the question of where the children get \ntheir souls is sticky. If it's just the characteristics of personality that \ngot transferred to the original chems, then you have to either say that \n\"souls\" weren't really implanted into the chems, or else accept the complex \nview (personality = soul).\n\nThis might make the segment below worth re-examining:" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Turin asks\nWhen you say [made to be ensouled] does that mean a downloaded personality\nprompts God to endow the organism supporting the persona a soul or that it\nshares a soul with the organism with the original personality, Kypris or\nPas. In other words, is Hammerstone Pas? Does the soul constitute the\nidentity even if the personae are identical?\n\nYes. I believe that Hamerstone is Typhon (Pas is a similar but different\nmatter) without his memories. You see? Memories don't equal the soul, or\nelse what of the soul of the sleepers in the Whorl? Are they different\npersons after that? Frankly, I don't think it is coincidental that the\nfemale chems looked like Mamelta. And IMO this is the explanation of Silk\nrealizing that he and Sand are \"brothers\".\n\nBut a soul is related to memory. Hammerstone becomes (it seems) a very\ndifferent person from the fellow Severian met in the mountain." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "I would very tentatively guess that a better expression would have been \"a \npersona is related to memory\". To say that a soul is related to memory \nimplies that with different memories you have a different soul - thus you're \nback to the complex view." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Civit asks\nAn interesting side thread to that entire issue is the theme which recurs\nrepeatedly about imitation. Someone asks Silk what would happen if a \ndemon\ntried to impersonate a god. A parallel question would then be, what if an\nAI\ntries to impersonate a soul? Does Silk's answer to that question hold up\nfor\neither case?" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Here I think my own confusion with the word \"soul\" bit me, when I look at it \nnow. An AI could imitate a human persona, but to impersonate a \"soul\" would \nimply that we have some way of actually perceiving souls in humans, and the \nonly \"soul\" we really subjectively experience is our own. We just infer the \npresence of souls based on the personas we're presented with in other \npeople. In any event, looking at it now it doesn't really make sense. Mea \nculpa." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "know about chems, but it sort of worked for Quetzal. And Horn mimicked Silk\nand eventually in a way became him." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Come to think of it the simple/complex view problem does seem to bear on \nSilkhorn, with some interesting potential consequences depending on which \nview you believe. I'm going to have to think about this, because it does \nseem to suggest a way out of some problems that have always confused me with \nthat subject..." } ] }, { "message_id": "<242F9F12-4705-11D9-9452-0003939CE29C@earthlink.net>", "from": { "name": "Lisa Schaffer-Doggett", "address": "harlekin at earthlink.net" }, "date": "2004-12-05T12:33:20+00:00", "subject": "(urth) just in case anyone was wondering", "in_reply_to": "", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "On Saturday, December 4, 2004, at 12:15 PM, Chris wrote:\nCrush said:" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "Wolfe seems to me to have rejected Turing's standard for a \n\"self-conscious\"\nmachine and accepted Searle's Chinese Room argument." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "I think on this one, though, you may have meant the opposite of what \nyou said. I could be wrong, but I think if Wolfe accepted Searle's \nargument then he would say that no chems have souls, period. Searle \nargues (in variously stronger or weaker forms) against the very \npossibility of AI. Turing, on the other hand, to use Turin's terms, \nseems to give up on the \"ontological\" problem (whether AI's are \n\"really\" conscious or \"really\" have souls) and goes for the \n\"epistemological\", saying - if I interpret the quote correctly - that \nif it LOOKS conscious then I'm going to say it IS conscious, and since \nthat's as close to the reality as we can get, let's say that we \"know\" \nit's conscious. This seems to go along somewhat with what you are \nsaying about Wolfe's opinion.\n\nI'm arguing that Wolfe doesn't seem to take a hard position on either \nof those; his opinion is moral, rather than ontological or \nepistemological. This ties in neatly with another thread of the \nconversation - Turin differentiated between having a soul and being a \nperson at some point, I believe. I'm willing to expand on this at this \npoint - \"having a soul\" is a possible property in reality, a statement \nabout the real world. To know that something has a soul is to know \nsomething about what *is*. In the sense I'm talking about here (not \nthe sense used in Rose's quote), personhood is a *moral status* - a \nstatement about how someone/something *ought* to be treated. You can \ngrant something personhood without granting it a soul, and (this is \narguable, but not an argument we want to get into here) you can grant \na soul without granting personhood.\n\nSilk *treats* Rose-in-Marble as he would treat Rose, but this doesn't \nmean he somehow knows Rose is in there. He can't know. In fact he \nseems troubled by some doubts if I recall correctly. But regardless, \nhe grants her personhood and treats her accordingly. This may seem \njust a sentimental streak in Wolfe, or non-controversial, but in a way \nit's a substantial position because it would grant moral rights to AI." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "At the risk of diving in over my head and, worse, adding nothing useful \nto this interesting discussion, I'd like to share an epiphany I had \nwhile reading above. In a universe that is \"of God\" (not simply, \"by \nGod\", implying a separation that seems impossible to me) all creatures \nshould have souls. That is, they are all a little bit of the divine \nimpulse. The difference I think, is that humans have achieved a level \nof self awareness that has separated them from the divine (in a sense \nwe're all little demiurges) So, the more \"human\" a chem or inhumi \nbecomes, the more its soul becomes a separate entity from the \"godhead\" \nand the more it becomes responsible for it's own actions and morality \nbecomes an issue. I hope this isn't ridiculous or off the point.\n\nDon" } ] }, { "message_id": "<18181552183.20041205230331@poczta.fm>", "from": { "name": "Stanis³aw Bocian", "address": "sbocian at poczta.fm" }, "date": "2004-12-05T13:51:31+00:00", "subject": "(urth) just in case anyone was wondering", "in_reply_to": "<004e01c4d9a4$edb14c20$4c1e4b0a@vcorp.ad.vrsn.com>", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Saturday, December 4, 2004, 2:59:45 AM, James Wynn wrote:\n\nJW> That's what I'm trying to say. Wolfe's general story-telling from Fifth\nJW> Head, Latro, and the Sun cycle could legitimately lead one to think that\nJW> Wolfe sees the soul as pure information. But a few key statements in LS and\nJW> SS and now The Wizard Knight lead me to believe that Wolfe probably\nJW> *actually* considers the soul to be *somehow* transcendent* of matter. If\nJW> the soul were not transcendent to the medium then the soul would not\nJW> typically \"leave the body\" when it was no longer useful as the Narrator of\nJW> the SS says it does.\n\nJW> Nor would Gylf's death be significantly different from Mani's in that Mani's\nJW> soul would die when the cat does (because Mani is the merger of the\nJW> elemental and the cat) but the elemental spirit would lilve on. It seems to\nJW> me that Able was saying that \"Gylf's soul\" would not die with him because it\nJW> was ultimately created by the Most High God.\n\nJW> Wolfe seems to me to have rejected Turing's standard for a \"self-conscious\"\nJW> machine and accepted Searle's Chinese Room argument.\n\nJW> But if anyone were to apply the model of \"soul = information\" he could\nJW> hardly be blamed. That model works for most that happens in a Wolfe novel.\n\n\nI think it would be relevant to mention, that in Eastern tradition,\ncommon for Jews, Zoroastrian Persians, Gnostics and early Christians,\nMan was not divided into two parts, but in three. Cartesius thinks\nthat man consists of mind and body, but in the ancient tradition, man\nconsists of body, soul, spirit (soma, psyche, pneuma.) Body is body,\npsyche is memory, psychic, reason (with reason it is more\ncomplicated), pneuma - spirit - is the spark of the fire of God which\nmakes us men. The body and the psyche can be destroyed or damaged, or\nchanged, so that I will remember something else, but the spirit -\npneuma - remains.\n\nIt could also be compared with transcendental subject in\nphenomenology. When we try to reach the transcendetal subject we must\ntreat provisionally all outside experience as unproved and possibly\nillusional - including our memory.\n\nThe good example is a quite good and Gnostic film \"Dark City\" by Alex\nProyas. In it some kind of aliens have set up an experimental city,\nand keep exchanging memories of men to try to discover, what makes\ntheir identity. The hero gets the memory of a multiple murderer.\n\nhttp://www.eskimo.com/~noir/ftitles/darkcity2/index.shtml" }, { "kind": "sig", "depth": 0, "text": "Stanislaus Bocian\n\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\nStartuj z INTERIA.PL!!! >>> http://link.interia.pl/f1837" } ] } ] }