Friday, December 10, 2004, 2:06:30 PM, Andrew Bollen wrote:
AB> Been far too busy to really follow the interesting discussion on AB> Wolfean soul dynamics here recently, but think it's worth pointing AB> out that he is perhaps more explicit about some of these things in AB> Wizard Knight than he is anywhere else. In Wizard, Mani at one AB> point asks Able if his (Mani's) soul will survive death. No, says AB> Able: the cat part of Mani will die utterly, and the spirit AB> AB> part will return to what it was before, something which "thinks AB> it's alive", but isn't. The Mani personality is a fusion of spirit AB> and flesh which will not survive the death of the former.
AB> I think Wolfe believes (or at least he believes in his fiction) AB> that the world is pervaded by Spirit which can infuse just about AB> anything to form a Soul - blood-drinking reptiles, twigs & moss, AB> machines, animals. But these Souls are not necessarily immortal. AB> Humans are special, because human Souls are immortal. This AB> presumably is by an act of grace from God.
AB> I don't pretend to any real knowledge of Chrisitian orthodoxy, but AB> I don't see anything so far which calls for the Inquisition.
When the question if one of orthodoxy, I think it is the best to
quote an authority, as as for Catholic orthodoxy, St Thomas
Aquinas is one of the best. The whole is a bit long, so I will
give a shorter summary at the beginning. By the way, Aquinas
always begins with counterarguments, his own opinions are after "I
answer that:"
Summary:
Sum. theol., I, 75, 3, resp. "Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute animals have no "per se" operations they are not subsistent." (My comment - The souls of animals have no being apart from the body. Souls of both animals and men are forms of the body, but the soul of men is immortal and have its own being independent of body.)
Sum. theol., I, 78, 1, arg. 1 "...five genera of powers in the
soul---namely, vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and
intellectual."
Sum. theol., I, 78, 1, resp. "There are five genera of powers of the
soul, as above numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four
are called modes of living. The reason of this diversity lies in the
various souls being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the
soul transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various
ways; for the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is
related to it as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore,
an operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature
that it is not even performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the
operation of the "rational soul." Below this, there is another
operation of the soul, which is indeed performed through a corporeal
organ, but not through a corporeal quality, and this is the operation
of the "sensitive soul"; for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and
other such corporeal qualities are required for the work of the
senses, yet they are not required in such a way that the operation of
the senses takes place by virtue of such qualities; but only for the
proper disposition of the organ. The lowest of the operations of the
soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue
of a corporeal quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the
corporeal nature; because the movements of bodies are caused by an
extrinsic principle, while these operations are from an intrinsic
principle; for this is common to all the operations of the soul;
since every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. Such is the
operation of the "vegetative soul"; for digestion, and what follows,
is caused instrumentally by the action of heat, as the Philosopher
says (De Anima ii, 4)."
Sum. theol., I, 76, 3, resp. "We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul. ... so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man."
Full quotes:
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.toc.html (Table of Contents)
http://www.ccel.org/info/nav.htm (Navigation hints)
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q75.html
Summa Theologiae, Part I Question. 75
"Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we
now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and
corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and
secondly of his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of
man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except
in so far as the body has relation to the soul. Hence the first
object of our consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius
(Ang. Hier. xi) says that three things are to be found in spiritual
substances---essence, power, and operation---we shall treat first of
what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs
to its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation.
Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is
the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union
of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven
points of inquiry.
(1) Whether the soul is a body?
(2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?
(3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?
(4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?
(5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?
(6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?
(7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel? "
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q75_A3.html
Question. 75 Article. 3 Whether the souls of brute animals are
subsistent?
Objection 1: It would seem that the souls of brute animals are
subsistent. For man is of the same 'genus' as other animals; and, as
we have just shown (A[2]), the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore
the souls of other animals are subsistent.
Objection 2: Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to
sensible objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to
intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the body,
apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty,
apart from the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since the
souls of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are
subsistent; just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent.
Objection 3: Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But
the body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute
animals has an operation apart from the body.
On the contrary, Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi,
xvii: "Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the
souls of animals are not subsistent."
I answer that, The ancient philosophers made no distinction between
sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has
been said (A[1]). Plato, however, drew a distinction between
intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal
principle, maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs
to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of
brute animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the
operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a
corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent
operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with
change in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of the eye
is affected by a reflection of color: and so with the other senses.
Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has no "per se" operation
of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to
the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute
animals have no "per se" operations they are not subsistent. For the
operation of anything follows the mode of its being.
Reply to Objection 1: Although man is of the same "genus" as other
animals, he is of a different "species." Specific difference is
derived from the difference of form; nor does every difference of
form necessarily imply a diversity of "genus."
Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the sensitive faculty to the
sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual
faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is in
potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations
differ, inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is
accompanied with change in the body; so that excessive strength of
the sensible corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of
the intellect. For an intellect that understands the highest of
intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that
are lower. If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the
body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect
requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of
the phantasms.
Reply to Objection 3: Motive power is of two kinds. One, the
appetitive power, commands motion. The operation of this power in the
sensitive soul is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and
passions of a like nature are accompanied by a change in the body.
The other motive power is that which executes motion in adapting the
members for obeying the appetite; and the act of this power does not
consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear that to
move is not an act of the sensitive soul without the body."
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q76_A3.html
Question. 76 Article. 3 - Whether besides the intellectual soul there
are in man other souls essentially different from one another?
Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls
essentially different from one another?
" Objection 1: It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there
are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such
as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and
incorruptible are not of the same substance. But the intellectual
soul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and
the nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above (Q[75], A[6]).
Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the sensitive
soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same.
Objection 2: Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is
incorruptible; on the contrary, "corruptible and incorruptible differ
generically," says the Philosopher, Metaph. x (Did. ix, 10). But the
sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute animals, is
corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive
soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same "genus." Now an
animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul; and, therefore,
"animal" will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which
is absurd.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii,
2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the
form. But "rational," which is the difference constituting man, is
taken from the intellectual soul; while he is called "animal" by
reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore
the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a
sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual
soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but
presupposes it as a material subject.
On the contrary, It is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus
xv: "Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and
other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and
which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, which obeys
the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that
both gives life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself
by its own reasoning."
I answer that, Plato held that there were several souls in one body,
distinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different
vital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the
concupiscible in the heart, and the power of knowledge in the brain.
Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard
to those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this
reason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have
been divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as
sense and appetite. Now this would not be the case if the various
principles of the soul's operations were essentially different, and
distributed in the various parts of the body. But with regard to the
intellectual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be "only
logically" distinct from the other parts of the soul, "or also
locally."
The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was
supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, but as its motor.
For it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be
moved by several motors; and still less if it be moved according to
its various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to
the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially
different souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three
different reasons.
In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which
there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one
form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the
same source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are
denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for
instance, "a white man." If, therefore, man were 'living' by one
form, the vegetative soul, and 'animal' by another form, the
sensitive soul, and "man" by another form, the intellectual soul, it
would follow that man is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues,
Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6), against Plato, that if the idea of an
animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal is
not absolutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that
there are several souls in the body, he asks (De Anima i, 5), "what
contains them?"---that is, what makes them one? It cannot be said
that they are united by the one body; because rather does the soul
contain the body and make it one, than the reverse.
Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one
thing is predicated of another. Those things which are derived from
various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if
the forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that
something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of
essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the
subject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is
presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is
colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.)
Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and
another form by which it is a man, it follows either that one of
these two things could not be predicated of the other, except
accidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one
another---or that one would be predicated of the other according to
the second manner of essential predication, if one soul be
presupposed to the other. But both of these consequences are clearly
false: because "animal" is predicated of man essentially and not
accidentally; and man is not part of the definition of an animal, but
the other way about. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing
is animal and man; otherwise man would not really be the thing which
is an animal, so that animal can be essentially predicated of man.
Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one
operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could
never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially
one.
We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the
intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul.
This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of
species and forms. For we observe that the species and forms of
things differ from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in
the order of things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate,
and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and
in each of these genera there are various degrees. For this reason
Aristotle, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things
to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of
unity. And (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls to the
species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon
contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual soul contains
virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals,
and to the nutritive souls of plants. Therefore, as a surface which
is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and
pentagonal by another---since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous
as contained in the pentagonal---so neither is Socrates a man by one
soul, and animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both
animal and man.
Reply to Objection 1: The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by
reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being
intellectual. When, therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is
corruptible; but when with sensibility it has also intellectuality,
it is incorruptible. For although sensibility does not give
incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its
incorruptibility.
Reply to Objection 2: Not forms, but composites, are classified
either generically or specifically. Now man is corruptible like other
animals. And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which
is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference
between man and the other animals.
Reply to Objection 3: The embryo has first of all a soul which is
merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a
more perfect soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will
be shown further on (Q[118], A[2], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 4: We must not consider the diversity of natural
things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions,
which flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can
apprehend one and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as
we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs
to the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider
separately what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as
something imperfect and material. And because it observes that this
is something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence the
notion of the "genus"; while that wherein the intellectual soul
exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; thence
it gathers the "difference" of man."
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q78_A1.html
Question 78 Article. 1
Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the
soul?
"Objection 1: It would seem that there are not to be distinguished
five genera of powers in the soul---namely, vegetative, sensitive,
appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul
are called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly
assigned---namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the
rational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of powers in the
soul, and not five.
Objection 2: Further, the powers of the soul are the principles of
its vital operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said to live. For
the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2): "In several ways a thing is
said to live, and even if only one of these is present, the thing is
said to live; as intellect and sense, local movement and rest, and
lastly, movement of decrease and increase due to nourishment."
Therefore there are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the
appetitive is excluded.
Objection 3: Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned
as regards what is common to all the powers. Now desire is common to
each power of the soul. For sight desires an appropriate visible
object; whence we read (Ecclus. 40:22): "The eye desireth favor and
beauty, but more than these green sown fields." In the same way every
other power desires its appropriate object. Therefore the appetitive
power should not be made a special genus of the powers of the soul.
Objection 4: Further, the moving principle in animals is sense,
intellect or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10).
Therefore the motive power should not be added to the above as a
special genus of soul.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), "The powers
are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotion,
and the intellectual."
I answer that, There are five genera of powers of the soul, as above
numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes
of living. The reason of this diversity lies in the various souls
being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul
transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various ways; for
the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related to
it as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an
operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that
it is not even performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the
operation of the "rational soul." Below this, there is another
operation of the soul, which is indeed performed through a corporeal
organ, but not through a corporeal quality, and this is the operation
of the "sensitive soul"; for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and
other such corporeal qualities are required for the work of the
senses, yet they are not required in such a way that the operation of
the senses takes place by virtue of such qualities; but only for the
proper disposition of the organ. The lowest of the operations of the
soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue
of a corporeal quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the
corporeal nature; because the movements of bodies are caused by an
extrinsic principle, while these operations are from an intrinsic
principle; for this is common to all the operations of the soul;
since every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. Such is the
operation of the "vegetative soul"; for digestion, and what follows,
is caused instrumentally by the action of heat, as the Philosopher
says (De Anima ii, 4).
Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their
objects. For the higher a power is, the more universal is the object
to which it extends, as we have said above (Q[77], A[3], ad 4). But
the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple
order. For in the soul there is a power the object of which is only
the body that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are
called "vegetative" for the vegetative power acts only on the body to
which the soul is united. There is another genus in the powers of the
soul, which genus regards a more universal object---namely, every
sensible body, not only the body to which the soul is united. And
there is yet another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus
regards a still more universal object---namely, not only the sensible
body, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the
latter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard
not merely to that which is united to them, but also to something
extrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be united to
the object about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this
something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's operation,
must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as
this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the
soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In this way there are
two kinds of powers ---namely, the "sensitive" in regard to the less
common object---the sensible body; and the "intellectual," in regard
to the most common object---universal being. Secondly, forasmuch as
the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something
extrinsic. And in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the
soul: one---the "appetitive"---in respect of which the soul is
referred to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the
intention; the other---the "locomotive" power---in respect of which
the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its
operation and movement; for every animal is moved for the purpose of
realizing its desires and intentions.
The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of
living things. There are some living things in which there exists
only vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with
the vegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the
locomotive power; such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are
others which besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals,
which require many things for their life, and consequently movement
to seek necessaries of life from a distance. And there are some
living things which with these have intellectual power---namely, men.
But the appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living
things; because wherever there is sense there is also appetite (De
Anima ii, 3).
Thus the first two objectives are hereby solved.
Reply to Objection 3: The "natural appetite" is that inclination
which each thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by
its natural appetite each power desires something suitable to itself.
But the "animal appetite" results from the form apprehended; this
sort of appetite requires a special power of the soul---mere
apprehension does not suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists in
its own nature, whereas in the apprehensive power it exists not
according to its own nature, but according to its likeness. Whence it
is clear that sight desires naturally a visible object for the
purpose of its act only---namely, for the purpose of seeing; but the
animal by the appetitive power desires the thing seen, not merely for
the purpose of seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the
soul did not require things perceived by the senses, except on
account of the actions of the senses, that is, for the purpose of
sensing them; there would be no need for a special genus of
appetitive powers, since the natural appetite of the powers would
suffice.
Reply to Objection 4: Although sense and appetite are principles of
movement in perfect animals, yet sense and appetite, as such, are not
sufficient to cause movement, unless another power be added to them;
for immovable animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have not
the power of motion. Now this motive power is not only in the
appetite and sense as commanding the movement, but also in the parts
of the body, to make them obey the appetite of the soul which moves
them. Of this we have a sign in the fact that when the members are
deprived of their natural disposition, they do not move in obedience
to the appetite."