Subject: (urth) Souls'n'stuff in Wizard Knight

From: Andrew Bollen <abollen at internode.on.net>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 05:06:50 +0000

Been far too busy to really follow the interesting discussion on Wolfean soul dynamics here recently, but think it's worth pointing out that he is perhaps more explicit about some of these things in Wizard Knight than he is anywhere else. In Wizard, Mani at one point asks Able if his (Mani's) soul will survive death. No, says Able: the cat part of Mani will die utterly, and the spirit part will return to what it was before, something which "thinks it's alive", but isn't. The Mani personality is a fusion of spirit and flesh which will not survive the death of the former.

I think Wolfe believes (or at least he believes in his fiction) that the world is pervaded by Spirit which can infuse just about anything to form a Soul - blood-drinking reptiles, twigs & moss, machines, animals. But these Souls are not necessarily immortal. Humans are special, because human Souls are immortal. This presumably is by an act of grace from God. 

I don't pretend to any real knowledge of Chrisitian orthodoxy, but I don't see anything so far which calls for the Inquisition. Where Wolfe maybe does start to run the risk of auto da fe is in the way this act of grace seems to be available to lesser beings as well. When Able gives his blood to Disiri at the end of Wizard, surely it upgrades her soul to fully human-rated, presumably with the immortal feature included. She's no longer a construction of twig & moss, when viewed in her true form; she's a beautiful young woman. At the end, she's going to be allowed to go along with Able on his new assignment, presumably in Skai (or beyond?). Without Able's blood, she's the same as Mani: a "freakish" combination of an elemental, soul-less spirit, and some physical stuff which will eventually unravel.

I find it impossible to believe the same kind of thing is not intended, in time, for the inhumi in Short Sun. (And what about Marble?)

BTW, I know that Wizard Knight hasn't gotten a lot of cheers on this list, but I have to say that I think Wizard is excellent. 

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From: Stanis³aw Bocian <sbocian at poczta.fm>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 13:47:10 +0000

Friday, December 10, 2004, 2:06:30 PM, Andrew Bollen wrote:

AB> Been far too busy to really follow the interesting discussion on
AB> Wolfean soul dynamics here recently, but think it's worth pointing
AB> out that he is perhaps more explicit about some of these things in
AB> Wizard Knight than he is anywhere else. In Wizard, Mani at one
AB> point  asks Able if his (Mani's) soul will survive death. No, says
AB> Able: the cat part of Mani will die utterly, and the spirit AB>
AB> part will return to what it was before, something which "thinks
AB> it's alive", but isn't. The Mani personality is a fusion of spirit
AB> and flesh which will not survive the death of the former.

AB> I think Wolfe believes (or at least he believes in his fiction)
AB> that the world is pervaded by Spirit which can infuse just about
AB> anything to form a Soul - blood-drinking reptiles, twigs & moss,
AB> machines, animals. But these Souls are not necessarily immortal.
AB> Humans are special, because human Souls are immortal. This
AB> presumably is by an act of grace from God.

AB> I don't pretend to any real knowledge of Chrisitian orthodoxy, but
AB> I don't see anything so far which calls for the Inquisition.

    When the question if one of orthodoxy, I think it is the best to
    quote an authority, as as for Catholic orthodoxy, St Thomas
    Aquinas is one of the best. The whole is a bit long, so I will
    give a shorter summary at the beginning. By the way, Aquinas
    always begins with counterarguments, his own opinions are after "I
    answer that:"

   Summary:

   Sum. theol., I, 75, 3, resp. "Wherefore we conclude that as the
souls of brute animals have no "per se" operations they are not
subsistent." (My comment - The souls of animals have no being apart
from the body. Souls of both animals and men are forms of the body,
but the soul of men is immortal and have its own being independent of
body.)

 Sum. theol., I, 78, 1, arg. 1  "...five genera of powers in the
 soul---namely, vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and
 intellectual."

 Sum. theol., I, 78, 1, resp. "There are five genera of powers of the
 soul, as above numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four
 are called modes of living. The reason of this diversity lies in the
 various souls being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the
 soul transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various
 ways; for the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is
 related to it as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore,
 an operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature
 that it is not even performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the
 operation of the "rational soul." Below this, there is another
 operation of the soul, which is indeed performed through a corporeal
 organ, but not through a corporeal quality, and this is the operation
 of the "sensitive soul"; for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and
 other such corporeal qualities are required for the work of the
 senses, yet they are not required in such a way that the operation of
 the senses takes place by virtue of such qualities; but only for the
 proper disposition of the organ. The lowest of the operations of the
 soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue
 of a corporeal quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the
 corporeal nature; because the movements of bodies are caused by an
 extrinsic principle, while these operations are from an intrinsic
 principle; for this is common to all the operations of the soul;
 since every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. Such is the
 operation of the "vegetative soul"; for digestion, and what follows,
 is caused instrumentally by the action of heat, as the Philosopher
 says (De Anima ii, 4)."

 Sum. theol., I, 76, 3, resp. "We must therefore conclude that in man
the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are
numerically one soul. ... so neither is Socrates a man by one soul,
and animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal
and man."

Full quotes:

http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.toc.html   (Table of Contents)

http://www.ccel.org/info/nav.htm  (Navigation hints)

http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q75.html

Summa Theologiae, Part I Question. 75

  "Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we
  now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and
  corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and
  secondly of his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of
  man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except
  in so far as the body has relation to the soul. Hence the first
  object of our consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius
  (Ang. Hier. xi) says that three things are to be found in spiritual
  substances---essence, power, and operation---we shall treat first of
  what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs
  to its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation.

 Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is
 the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union
 of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven
 points of inquiry.

 (1) Whether the soul is a body?

 (2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?

(3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?

(4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?

(5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?

(6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?

 (7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel? "

http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q75_A3.html

 Question. 75 Article. 3 Whether the souls of brute animals are
 subsistent?

 Objection 1: It would seem that the souls of brute animals are
 subsistent. For man is of the same 'genus' as other animals; and, as
 we have just shown (A[2]), the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore
 the souls of other animals are subsistent.

 Objection 2: Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to
 sensible objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to
 intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the body,
 apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty,
 apart from the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since the
 souls of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are
 subsistent; just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent.

 Objection 3: Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But
 the body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute
 animals has an operation apart from the body.

 On the contrary, Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi,
 xvii: "Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the
 souls of animals are not subsistent."

 I answer that, The ancient philosophers made no distinction between
 sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has
 been said (A[1]). Plato, however, drew a distinction between
 intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal
 principle, maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs
 to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of
 brute animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the
 operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a
 corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent
 operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with
 change in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of the eye
 is affected by a reflection of color: and so with the other senses.
 Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has no "per se" operation
 of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to
 the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute
 animals have no "per se" operations they are not subsistent. For the
 operation of anything follows the mode of its being.

 Reply to Objection 1: Although man is of the same "genus" as other
 animals, he is of a different "species." Specific difference is
 derived from the difference of form; nor does every difference of
 form necessarily imply a diversity of "genus."

 Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the sensitive faculty to the
 sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual
 faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is in
 potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations
 differ, inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is
 accompanied with change in the body; so that excessive strength of
 the sensible corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of
 the intellect. For an intellect that understands the highest of
 intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that
 are lower. If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the
 body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect
 requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of
 the phantasms.

 Reply to Objection 3: Motive power is of two kinds. One, the
 appetitive power, commands motion. The operation of this power in the
 sensitive soul is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and
 passions of a like nature are accompanied by a change in the body.
 The other motive power is that which executes motion in adapting the
 members for obeying the appetite; and the act of this power does not
 consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear that to
 move is not an act of the sensitive soul without the body."

http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q76_A3.html

 Question. 76 Article. 3 - Whether besides the intellectual soul there
 are in man other souls essentially different from one another?

 Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls
 essentially different from one another?

 " Objection 1: It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there
 are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such
 as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and
 incorruptible are not of the same substance. But the intellectual
 soul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and
 the nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above (Q[75], A[6]).
 Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the sensitive
 soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same.

 Objection 2: Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is
 incorruptible; on the contrary, "corruptible and incorruptible differ
 generically," says the Philosopher, Metaph. x (Did. ix, 10). But the
 sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute animals, is
 corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive
 soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same "genus." Now an
 animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul; and, therefore,
 "animal" will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which
 is absurd.

 Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii,
 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the
 form. But "rational," which is the difference constituting man, is
 taken from the intellectual soul; while he is called "animal" by
 reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore
 the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a
 sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual
 soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but
 presupposes it as a material subject.

 On the contrary, It is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus
 xv: "Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and
 other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and
 which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, which obeys
 the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that
 both gives life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself
 by its own reasoning."

 I answer that, Plato held that there were several souls in one body,
 distinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different
 vital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the
 concupiscible in the heart, and the power of knowledge in the brain.
 Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard
 to those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this
 reason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have
 been divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as
 sense and appetite. Now this would not be the case if the various
 principles of the soul's operations were essentially different, and
 distributed in the various parts of the body. But with regard to the
 intellectual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be "only
 logically" distinct from the other parts of the soul, "or also
 locally."

 The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was
 supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, but as its motor.
 For it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be
 moved by several motors; and still less if it be moved according to
 its various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to
 the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially
 different souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three
 different reasons.

 In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which
 there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one
 form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the
 same source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are
 denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for
 instance, "a white man." If, therefore, man were 'living' by one
 form, the vegetative soul, and 'animal' by another form, the
 sensitive soul, and "man" by another form, the intellectual soul, it
 would follow that man is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues,
 Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6), against Plato, that if the idea of an
 animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal is
 not absolutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that
 there are several souls in the body, he asks (De Anima i, 5), "what
 contains them?"---that is, what makes them one? It cannot be said
 that they are united by the one body; because rather does the soul
 contain the body and make it one, than the reverse.

 Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one
 thing is predicated of another. Those things which are derived from
 various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if
 the forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that
 something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of
 essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the
 subject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is
 presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is
 colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.)
 Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and
 another form by which it is a man, it follows either that one of
 these two things could not be predicated of the other, except
 accidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one
 another---or that one would be predicated of the other according to
 the second manner of essential predication, if one soul be
 presupposed to the other. But both of these consequences are clearly
 false: because "animal" is predicated of man essentially and not
 accidentally; and man is not part of the definition of an animal, but
 the other way about. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing
 is animal and man; otherwise man would not really be the thing which
 is an animal, so that animal can be essentially predicated of man.

 Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one
 operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could
 never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially
 one.

 We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the
 intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul.
 This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of
 species and forms. For we observe that the species and forms of
 things differ from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in
 the order of things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate,
 and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and
 in each of these genera there are various degrees. For this reason
 Aristotle, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things
 to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of
 unity. And (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls to the
 species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon
 contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual soul contains
 virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals,
 and to the nutritive souls of plants. Therefore, as a surface which
 is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and
 pentagonal by another---since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous
 as contained in the pentagonal---so neither is Socrates a man by one
 soul, and animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both
 animal and man.

 Reply to Objection 1: The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by
 reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being
 intellectual. When, therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is
 corruptible; but when with sensibility it has also intellectuality,
 it is incorruptible. For although sensibility does not give
 incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its
 incorruptibility.

 Reply to Objection 2: Not forms, but composites, are classified
 either generically or specifically. Now man is corruptible like other
 animals. And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which
 is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference
 between man and the other animals.

 Reply to Objection 3: The embryo has first of all a soul which is
 merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a
 more perfect soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will
 be shown further on (Q[118], A[2], ad 2).

 Reply to Objection 4: We must not consider the diversity of natural
 things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions,
 which flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can
 apprehend one and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as
 we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs
 to the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider
 separately what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as
 something imperfect and material. And because it observes that this
 is something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence the
 notion of the "genus"; while that wherein the intellectual soul
 exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; thence
 it gathers the "difference" of man."

http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q78_A1.html

 Question 78 Article. 1
 
 Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the
 soul?

 "Objection 1: It would seem that there are not to be distinguished
 five genera of powers in the soul---namely, vegetative, sensitive,
 appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul
 are called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly
 assigned---namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the
 rational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of powers in the
 soul, and not five.

 Objection 2: Further, the powers of the soul are the principles of
 its vital operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said to live. For
 the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2): "In several ways a thing is
 said to live, and even if only one of these is present, the thing is
 said to live; as intellect and sense, local movement and rest, and
 lastly, movement of decrease and increase due to nourishment."
 Therefore there are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the
 appetitive is excluded.

 Objection 3: Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned
 as regards what is common to all the powers. Now desire is common to
 each power of the soul. For sight desires an appropriate visible
 object; whence we read (Ecclus. 40:22): "The eye desireth favor and
 beauty, but more than these green sown fields." In the same way every
 other power desires its appropriate object. Therefore the appetitive
 power should not be made a special genus of the powers of the soul.

 Objection 4: Further, the moving principle in animals is sense,
 intellect or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10).
 Therefore the motive power should not be added to the above as a
 special genus of soul.

 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), "The powers
 are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotion,
 and the intellectual."

 I answer that, There are five genera of powers of the soul, as above
 numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes
 of living. The reason of this diversity lies in the various souls
 being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul
 transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various ways; for
 the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related to
 it as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an
 operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that
 it is not even performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the
 operation of the "rational soul." Below this, there is another
 operation of the soul, which is indeed performed through a corporeal
 organ, but not through a corporeal quality, and this is the operation
 of the "sensitive soul"; for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and
 other such corporeal qualities are required for the work of the
 senses, yet they are not required in such a way that the operation of
 the senses takes place by virtue of such qualities; but only for the
 proper disposition of the organ. The lowest of the operations of the
 soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue
 of a corporeal quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the
 corporeal nature; because the movements of bodies are caused by an
 extrinsic principle, while these operations are from an intrinsic
 principle; for this is common to all the operations of the soul;
 since every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. Such is the
 operation of the "vegetative soul"; for digestion, and what follows,
 is caused instrumentally by the action of heat, as the Philosopher
 says (De Anima ii, 4).

 Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their
 objects. For the higher a power is, the more universal is the object
 to which it extends, as we have said above (Q[77], A[3], ad 4). But
 the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple
 order. For in the soul there is a power the object of which is only
 the body that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are
 called "vegetative" for the vegetative power acts only on the body to
 which the soul is united. There is another genus in the powers of the
 soul, which genus regards a more universal object---namely, every
 sensible body, not only the body to which the soul is united. And
 there is yet another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus
 regards a still more universal object---namely, not only the sensible
 body, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the
 latter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard
 not merely to that which is united to them, but also to something
 extrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be united to
 the object about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this
 something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's operation,
 must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as
 this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the
 soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In this way there are
 two kinds of powers ---namely, the "sensitive" in regard to the less
 common object---the sensible body; and the "intellectual," in regard
 to the most common object---universal being. Secondly, forasmuch as
 the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something
 extrinsic. And in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the
 soul: one---the "appetitive"---in respect of which the soul is
 referred to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the
 intention; the other---the "locomotive" power---in respect of which
 the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its
 operation and movement; for every animal is moved for the purpose of
 realizing its desires and intentions.

 The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of
 living things. There are some living things in which there exists
 only vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with
 the vegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the
 locomotive power; such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are
 others which besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals,
 which require many things for their life, and consequently movement
 to seek necessaries of life from a distance. And there are some
 living things which with these have intellectual power---namely, men.
 But the appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living
 things; because wherever there is sense there is also appetite (De
 Anima ii, 3).

 Thus the first two objectives are hereby solved.

 Reply to Objection 3: The "natural appetite" is that inclination
 which each thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by
 its natural appetite each power desires something suitable to itself.
 But the "animal appetite" results from the form apprehended; this
 sort of appetite requires a special power of the soul---mere
 apprehension does not suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists in
 its own nature, whereas in the apprehensive power it exists not
 according to its own nature, but according to its likeness. Whence it
 is clear that sight desires naturally a visible object for the
 purpose of its act only---namely, for the purpose of seeing; but the
 animal by the appetitive power desires the thing seen, not merely for
 the purpose of seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the
 soul did not require things perceived by the senses, except on
 account of the actions of the senses, that is, for the purpose of
 sensing them; there would be no need for a special genus of
 appetitive powers, since the natural appetite of the powers would
 suffice.

 Reply to Objection 4: Although sense and appetite are principles of
 movement in perfect animals, yet sense and appetite, as such, are not
 sufficient to cause movement, unless another power be added to them;
 for immovable animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have not
 the power of motion. Now this motive power is not only in the
 appetite and sense as commanding the movement, but also in the parts
 of the body, to make them obey the appetite of the soul which moves
 them. Of this we have a sign in the fact that when the members are
 deprived of their natural disposition, they do not move in obedience
 to the appetite."

-- 

    Stanislaus Bocian

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Startuj z INTERIA.PL!!! >>> http://link.interia.pl/f1837

---

From: Andrew Bollen <abollen at internode.on.net>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2004 14:17:03 +0000

Stanislaus - That's excellent! Thanks.