{ "export": { "source": "https://urth.darkrealm.vip/thread/urth/5993", "note": "Exported from an unofficial mirror of a public mailing list. Copyright in each message remains with the person who wrote it. Email addresses are obscured as `user at host`, the form the original archive published. This file was rebuilt from parsed fields rather than retained headers, so it is faithful in content but not byte-exact.", "addresses": "obscured as 'user at host'" }, "archive": "urth", "thread": { "id": 5993, "subject": "Silk Takes A Stab At The 'Problem Of Evil'", "messages": 8, "voices": 5, "first": "2011-04-12T23:39:27+00:00", "last": "2011-04-13T16:07:50+00:00" }, "messages": [ { "message_id": "", "from": { "name": "Daniel Petersen", "address": "danielottojackpetersen at gmail.com" }, "date": "2011-04-12T23:39:27+00:00", "subject": "(urth) Silk Takes A Stab At The 'Problem Of Evil'", "in_reply_to": null, "reply_link": null, "blocks": [ { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Any philosophy of religion or theology students out there? Is Silk arguing\nsomething of a 'freewill' theodicy here that still trades on a strong view\nof divine sovereignty?\n\nhttp://silkandhornheresy.blogspot.com/2011/04/silk-takes-stab-at-problem-of-evil.html\n\n-DOJP" } ] }, { "message_id": "", "from": { "name": "Lane Haygood", "address": "lhaygood at gmail.com" }, "date": "2011-04-13T00:03:08+00:00", "subject": "(urth) Silk Takes A Stab At The 'Problem Of Evil'", "in_reply_to": "", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Silk is arguing that the Outsider is not an occasionalist God. He doesn't control everything, and permits Evil (as a concept and metaphysical whole) because in the end Evil serves his great Purpose (which Man might not know). Little evils (like tsunami that kill thousands) are because the Outsider does not intervene or even control all events - God does not authorize every event as if he is a foreman at a construction site - but rather lets things flow organically. \n\nSent from my iPhone" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "On Apr 12, 2011, at 6:39 PM, Daniel Petersen wrote:\nAny philosophy of religion or theology students out there? Is Silk arguing something of a 'freewill' theodicy here that still trades on a strong view of divine sovereignty?\n\nhttp://silkandhornheresy.blogspot.com/2011/04/silk-takes-stab-at-problem-of-evil.html\n\n-DOJP\n_______________________________________________" } ] }, { "message_id": "", "from": { "name": "Dan'l Danehy-Oakes", "address": "danldo at gmail.com" }, "date": "2011-04-13T00:12:41+00:00", "subject": "(urth) Silk Takes A Stab At The 'Problem Of Evil'", "in_reply_to": "", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Elsewhere in tBotLS, Silk has an insight that strikes me heavily. I\ncan't recall where it is, but it occurs to him that the purpose of\nfree will is to give us the grace of consenting to what is going to\nhappen anyway." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "On Tue, Apr 12, 2011 at 5:03 PM, Lane Haygood wrote:\nSilk is arguing that the Outsider is not an occasionalist God. He doesn't\ncontrol everything, and permits Evil (as a concept and metaphysical whole)\nbecause in the end Evil serves his great Purpose (which Man might not know).\nLittle evils (like tsunami that kill thousands) are because the Outsider\ndoes not intervene or even control all events - God does not authorize every\nevent as if he is a foreman at a construction site - but rather lets things\nflow organically.\n\nSent from my iPhone\nOn Apr 12, 2011, at 6:39 PM, Daniel Petersen\n wrote:\n\nAny philosophy of religion or theology students out there? “Is Silk arguing\nsomething of a 'freewill' theodicy here that still trades on a strong view\nof divine sovereignty”\nhttp://silkandhornheresy.blogspot.com/2011/04/silk-takes-stab-at-problem-of-evil.html\n-DOJP\n\n_______________________________________________" } ] }, { "message_id": "<4DA51849.6030703@verizon.net>", "from": { "name": "David Stockhoff", "address": "dstockhoff at verizon.net" }, "date": "2011-04-13T03:28:09+00:00", "subject": "(urth) Silk Takes A Stab At The 'Problem Of Evil'", "in_reply_to": "", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Much like consenting to be governed by a king." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "On 4/12/2011 8:12 PM, Dan'l Danehy-Oakes wrote:\nElsewhere in tBotLS, Silk has an insight that strikes me heavily. I\ncan't recall where it is, but it occurs to him that the purpose of\nfree will is to give us the grace of consenting to what is going to\nhappen anyway.\n\nOn Tue, Apr 12, 2011 at 5:03 PM, Lane Haygood wrote:" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "Silk is arguing that the Outsider is not an occasionalist God. He doesn't\ncontrol everything, and permits Evil (as a concept and metaphysical whole)\nbecause in the end Evil serves his great Purpose (which Man might not know).\nLittle evils (like tsunami that kill thousands) are because the Outsider\ndoes not intervene or even control all events - God does not authorize every\nevent as if he is a foreman at a construction site - but rather lets things\nflow organically.\n\nSent from my iPhone\nOn Apr 12, 2011, at 6:39 PM, Daniel Petersen\n wrote:\n\nAny philosophy of religion or theology students out there? Is Silk arguing\nsomething of a 'freewill' theodicy here that still trades on a strong view\nof divine sovereignty?\nhttp://silkandhornheresy.blogspot.com/2011/04/silk-takes-stab-at-problem-of-evil.html\n-DOJP\n\n_______________________________________________" } ] }, { "message_id": "", "from": { "name": "Daniel Petersen", "address": "danielottojackpetersen at gmail.com" }, "date": "2011-04-13T09:30:25+00:00", "subject": "(urth) Silk Takes A Stab At The 'Problem Of Evil'", "in_reply_to": "<4DA51849.6030703@verizon.net>", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Lane Haygood wrote:\nSilk is arguing that the Outsider is not an occasionalist God. He doesn't\ncontrol everything, and permits Evil (as a concept and metaphysical whole)\nbecause in the end Evil serves his great Purpose (which Man might not\nknow).\nLittle evils (like tsunami that kill thousands) are because the Outsider\ndoes not intervene or even control all events - God does not authorize\nevery\nevent as if he is a foreman at a construction site - but rather lets things\nflow organically." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Ok, Lane, right, so Silk's conception of God (the Outsider) is not\n'occasionalist' (i.e. God *directly* causes all things), but the fact that\nGod 'permits' evil and forces it to serve his purposes 'however unwillingly'\nseems to fit in with Aquinas' scheme of primary and secondary causation.\n Evil is personified by Silk as *hating* God, yet it is 'harnessed' by God\nso that it 'serves' him by pointing us who get hurt by evil back to God for\nour true love and goodness and purpose.\n\nI think I agree with you that he's arguing that the Outsider allows his\ncreation to 'flow organically', but I just want to point out that Silk is\nstill conceiving of a God very much 'in control' in that his 'permissive\nwill' is orchestrating (if you like) all things towards his desired ends\n(which, though many are unknown as you point out, yet Silk takes a major\nknown end to be that of love between creature and Creator)." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Dan'l Danehy-Oakes wrote:\nElsewhere in tBotLS, Silk has an insight that strikes me heavily. I\ncan't recall where it is, but it occurs to him that the purpose of\nfree will is to give us the grace of consenting to what is going to\nhappen anyway." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Dan'l, I vaguely recall that too. It'd be good if we cold find the exact\nquote. I want to qualify that thought with the notion that those freewill\ncreatures are still somehow genuinely significant in their choices, that our\npart in 'what is going to happen anyway' (or 'consenting to be governed by a\nKing' as David Stockhoff said) really 'makes a difference' somehow.\n However, I'm not sure whether that's Silk's or Wolfe's view. Wolfe has\nkept me guessing on this. Sometimes he sounds pretty hard determinist\n(especially, as I seem to recall, in certain passages of tBotNS). Yet the\ndramas he plays out sound more libertarian. I know a compatibilist would\nsay that's just how things look but it's all causally determined even if our\n'choices' are 'real' based on our desires (which are determined by all that\ncomes before us). Is there any room for any kind of libertarian freewill in\nWolfe?\n\n-DOJP" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "On Wed, Apr 13, 2011 at 4:28 AM, David Stockhoff wrote:\nMuch like consenting to be governed by a king.\n\n\nOn 4/12/2011 8:12 PM, Dan'l Danehy-Oakes wrote:" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "Elsewhere in tBotLS, Silk has an insight that strikes me heavily. I\ncan't recall where it is, but it occurs to him that the purpose of\nfree will is to give us the grace of consenting to what is going to\nhappen anyway.\n\nOn Tue, Apr 12, 2011 at 5:03 PM, Lane Haygood wrote:" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 3, "text": "Silk is arguing that the Outsider is not an occasionalist God. He doesn't\ncontrol everything, and permits Evil (as a concept and metaphysical\nwhole)\nbecause in the end Evil serves his great Purpose (which Man might not\nknow).\nLittle evils (like tsunami that kill thousands) are because the Outsider\ndoes not intervene or even control all events - God does not authorize\nevery\nevent as if he is a foreman at a construction site - but rather lets\nthings\nflow organically.\n\nSent from my iPhone\nOn Apr 12, 2011, at 6:39 PM, Daniel Petersen\n wrote:\n\nAny philosophy of religion or theology students out there? Is Silk\narguing\nsomething of a 'freewill' theodicy here that still trades on a strong\nview\nof divine sovereignty?\n\nhttp://silkandhornheresy.blogspot.com/2011/04/silk-takes-stab-at-problem-of-evil.html\n-DOJP\n\n_______________________________________________" } ] }, { "message_id": "", "from": { "name": "Lane Haygood", "address": "lhaygood at gmail.com" }, "date": "2011-04-13T14:01:17+00:00", "subject": "(urth) Silk Takes A Stab At The 'Problem Of Evil'", "in_reply_to": "", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Ok, Lane, right, so Silk's conception of God (the Outsider) is not\n'occasionalist' (i.e. God *directly* causes all things), but the fact that\nGod 'permits' evil and forces it to serve his purposes 'however unwillingly'\nseems to fit in with Aquinas' scheme of primary and secondary causation.\n?Evil is personified by Silk as *hating* God, yet it is 'harnessed' by God\nso that it 'serves' him by pointing us who get hurt by evil back to God for\nour true love and goodness and purpose." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "I would say rather that God, as the first cause of all things, is the\ncause of evil as well as good, and while men are good at identifying\nlittle-e evil (the bad things that happen) we are not always good at\nidentifying big-E Evil (the form of Evil, from which all little-e\nevils are instances), but regardless, all evil/Evil is ultimately part\nof God's plan. This sounds a lot like the unknown purposes theodicy,\nwith bits of the soul-making thrown around. It's a fairly standard\ntype of theodicy: bad stuff happens but God is God and has some\nreason for it all." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "I think I agree with you that he's arguing that the Outsider allows his\ncreation to 'flow organically', but I just want to point out that Silk is\nstill conceiving of a God very much 'in control' in that his 'permissive\nwill' is orchestrating (if you like) all things towards his desired ends\n(which, though many are unknown as you point out, yet Silk takes a major\nknown end to be that of love between creature and Creator)." }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Sure. I didn't mean to make Silk out to be a deist. For Silk's God\n(and presumably, Wolfe's) desire and control are the same thing;\nremember, for the problem of evil to have any gravity at all God must\nbe both perfectly powerful and perfectly good. Thus, what God\ndesires, is, and God would not, as perfectly good, desire that which\nhe could not do.\n\nThe problem of evil is an interesting logical exercise, but I have\nnever been ultimately convinced of its efficacy (even as a\nnon-believer). It, like the ontological argument, comes laden with\nvalue presuppositions that are rarely made explicit, and it is filled\nwith nonsensical logical wrangling such as whether God needs to be\nable to do the impossible (create a round square, for example) to be\nperfectly powerful. I have an Orthodox friend who swears up and down\nthat perfect power need only encompass God's actions within the sphere\nof what is possible (e.g., it is not a hit against God's perfect\npotency to say that God cannot make a round square, because\nomnipotence is limited to the set of all possible actions), but a\nProtestant acquaintance that thinks that God can do the impossible\nbecause no limits of human logic apply to God. To make matters worse,\nI have yet to (myself) come up with a satisfactory definition of evil\nthat is not question-begging or reduced to some sort of naturalist\nhandwaving that \"it's evil because it is evil.\" Certainly I can point\nto actions that I think are evil (child abuse, for example) but I\nwonder if I am focusing on the end result without any reference to the\nmotivation or mindset. What about a parent that spanks their child\ntoo hard? The parent's motive is discipline, not injury, which ought\nto make a difference, even though the end result is the same." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Dan'l, I vaguely recall that too. ?It'd be good if we cold find the exact\nquote. ?I want to qualify that thought with the notion that those freewill\ncreatures are still somehow genuinely significant in their choices, that our\npart in 'what is going to happen anyway' (or 'consenting to be governed by a\nKing' as David Stockhoff said) really 'makes a difference' somehow.\n?However, I'm not sure whether that's Silk's or Wolfe's view. ?Wolfe has\nkept me guessing on this. ?Sometimes he sounds pretty hard determinist\n(especially, as I seem to recall, in certain passages of tBotNS). ?Yet the\ndramas he plays out sound more libertarian. “I know a compatibilist would\nsay that's just how things look but it's all causally determined even if our\n'choices' are 'real' based on our desires (which are determined by all that\ncomes before us). ?Is there any room for any kind of libertarian freewill in\nWolfe”" }, { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "The problem of free will is another tough nut because it comes laden\nwith lots of often-unanalyzed presuppositions, such as whether God's\nforeknowledge entails determination of the result. The same\naforementioned friends have divergent views, with one taking the\nposition that God does not need to know everything in order to be\nomniscient, if, for example, the thing to be known (the result of a\ncoin flip) is a matter of probability rather than certainty. Just\nbecause, for example, I do not know the result of a coin toss you\nwouldn't say that I am unknowledgable about coin tosses, the physics\ninvolved, or probability calculations. Even if I told you that given\nmy hand strength, the weight of the coin, and atmospheric conditions\nthe likelihood was greater that I would toss a heads, and I tossed a\ntails, you would simply say, \"well, he knew the probabilities.\" The\nother friend, predictably, takes the view that if God knows a thing,\nbecause God is atemporal and perceives all events in time\nsimultaneously, God has perfect recollective knowledge of the result\nof that coin toss. Friend 1 often rejoins that this just makes God\nthe perfect historian rather than an intellective being capable of\nfree thought on his own.\n\nFor my own part, being that time is an integral part of my cognition\nof the world around me, I cannot imagine what an atemporal being would\nthink... and yet my own views on philosophy say that a transcendent\nbeing such as God must be unlimited in both space and time, and would\nnot be saddled with the same cognitive requirements for\nintelligibility that I, a limited creature, am. But because each\nfriend takes different presuppositions as his starting point (one a\nvery continental, Hegelian view of the world, and the other a much\nmore classic Protestant view) they arrive at different answers to\nthese questions. So to answer whether we might freely desire a result\nset in stone and that be \"enough\" for free will supposes that \"will\"\nequates to our desires, which is itself a loaded proposition: might\nwe not act contrary to our desires, or at some last moment before we\ntake a volitional action, do we always desire to engage in that\naction?\n\nFor my own part, I do not think that the problem of freedom of the\nwill can be answered; how could we ever possibly determine whether our\nown actions were free or determined, let alone those of others whose\npsychology is closed to us. We are constrained to act as if our\nchoices are our own, regardless of whether we are autonomous or merely\nthe pawns of divinity.\n\nLH" } ] }, { "message_id": "<4DA5B96C.3090604@gmail.com>", "from": { "name": "António Pedro Marques", "address": "entonio at gmail.com" }, "date": "2011-04-13T14:55:40+00:00", "subject": "(urth) Silk Takes A Stab At The 'Problem Of Evil'", "in_reply_to": "", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "Well, Lane, I must say I've seldom if ever seen such a well-wrought \npresentation of these questions, the more coming from a non-believer (we may \ndiscuss that if anyone wishes to). It's so good I'm fully quoting it below \nfully aware of the sacrifice of electricity.\n\nLane Haygood wrote (13-04-2011 15:01):" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "Ok, Lane, right, so Silk's conception of God (the Outsider) is not\n'occasionalist' (i.e. God *directly* causes all things), but the fact that\nGod 'permits' evil and forces it to serve his purposes 'however unwillingly'\nseems to fit in with Aquinas' scheme of primary and secondary causation.\n Evil is personified by Silk as *hating* God, yet it is 'harnessed' by God\nso that it 'serves' him by pointing us who get hurt by evil back to God for\nour true love and goodness and purpose." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "I would say rather that God, as the first cause of all things, is the\ncause of evil as well as good, and while men are good at identifying\nlittle-e evil (the bad things that happen) we are not always good at\nidentifying big-E Evil (the form of Evil, from which all little-e\nevils are instances), but regardless, all evil/Evil is ultimately part\nof God's plan. This sounds a lot like the unknown purposes theodicy,\nwith bits of the soul-making thrown around. It's a fairly standard\ntype of theodicy: bad stuff happens but God is God and has some\nreason for it all." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "I think I agree with you that he's arguing that the Outsider allows his\ncreation to 'flow organically', but I just want to point out that Silk is\nstill conceiving of a God very much 'in control' in that his 'permissive\nwill' is orchestrating (if you like) all things towards his desired ends\n(which, though many are unknown as you point out, yet Silk takes a major\nknown end to be that of love between creature and Creator)." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Sure. I didn't mean to make Silk out to be a deist. For Silk's God\n(and presumably, Wolfe's) desire and control are the same thing;\nremember, for the problem of evil to have any gravity at all God must\nbe both perfectly powerful and perfectly good. Thus, what God\ndesires, is, and God would not, as perfectly good, desire that which\nhe could not do.\n\nThe problem of evil is an interesting logical exercise, but I have\nnever been ultimately convinced of its efficacy (even as a\nnon-believer). It, like the ontological argument, comes laden with\nvalue presuppositions that are rarely made explicit, and it is filled\nwith nonsensical logical wrangling such as whether God needs to be\nable to do the impossible (create a round square, for example) to be\nperfectly powerful. I have an Orthodox friend who swears up and down\nthat perfect power need only encompass God's actions within the sphere\nof what is possible (e.g., it is not a hit against God's perfect\npotency to say that God cannot make a round square, because\nomnipotence is limited to the set of all possible actions), but a\nProtestant acquaintance that thinks that God can do the impossible\nbecause no limits of human logic apply to God. To make matters worse,\nI have yet to (myself) come up with a satisfactory definition of evil\nthat is not question-begging or reduced to some sort of naturalist\nhandwaving that \"it's evil because it is evil.\" Certainly I can point\nto actions that I think are evil (child abuse, for example) but I\nwonder if I am focusing on the end result without any reference to the\nmotivation or mindset. What about a parent that spanks their child\ntoo hard? The parent's motive is discipline, not injury, which ought\nto make a difference, even though the end result is the same." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "Dan'l, I vaguely recall that too. It'd be good if we cold find the exact\nquote. I want to qualify that thought with the notion that those freewill\ncreatures are still somehow genuinely significant in their choices, that our\npart in 'what is going to happen anyway' (or 'consenting to be governed by a\nKing' as David Stockhoff said) really 'makes a difference' somehow.\n However, I'm not sure whether that's Silk's or Wolfe's view. Wolfe has\nkept me guessing on this. Sometimes he sounds pretty hard determinist\n(especially, as I seem to recall, in certain passages of tBotNS). Yet the\ndramas he plays out sound more libertarian. I know a compatibilist would\nsay that's just how things look but it's all causally determined even if our\n'choices' are 'real' based on our desires (which are determined by all that\ncomes before us). Is there any room for any kind of libertarian freewill in\nWolfe?" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "The problem of free will is another tough nut because it comes laden\nwith lots of often-unanalyzed presuppositions, such as whether God's\nforeknowledge entails determination of the result. The same\naforementioned friends have divergent views, with one taking the\nposition that God does not need to know everything in order to be\nomniscient, if, for example, the thing to be known (the result of a\ncoin flip) is a matter of probability rather than certainty. Just\nbecause, for example, I do not know the result of a coin toss you\nwouldn't say that I am unknowledgable about coin tosses, the physics\ninvolved, or probability calculations. Even if I told you that given\nmy hand strength, the weight of the coin, and atmospheric conditions\nthe likelihood was greater that I would toss a heads, and I tossed a\ntails, you would simply say, \"well, he knew the probabilities.\" The\nother friend, predictably, takes the view that if God knows a thing,\nbecause God is atemporal and perceives all events in time\nsimultaneously, God has perfect recollective knowledge of the result\nof that coin toss. Friend 1 often rejoins that this just makes God\nthe perfect historian rather than an intellective being capable of\nfree thought on his own.\n\nFor my own part, being that time is an integral part of my cognition\nof the world around me, I cannot imagine what an atemporal being would\nthink... and yet my own views on philosophy say that a transcendent\nbeing such as God must be unlimited in both space and time, and would\nnot be saddled with the same cognitive requirements for\nintelligibility that I, a limited creature, am. But because each\nfriend takes different presuppositions as his starting point (one a\nvery continental, Hegelian view of the world, and the other a much\nmore classic Protestant view) they arrive at different answers to\nthese questions. So to answer whether we might freely desire a result\nset in stone and that be \"enough\" for free will supposes that \"will\"\nequates to our desires, which is itself a loaded proposition: might\nwe not act contrary to our desires, or at some last moment before we\ntake a volitional action, do we always desire to engage in that\naction?\n\nFor my own part, I do not think that the problem of freedom of the\nwill can be answered; how could we ever possibly determine whether our\nown actions were free or determined, let alone those of others whose\npsychology is closed to us. We are constrained to act as if our\nchoices are our own, regardless of whether we are autonomous or merely\nthe pawns of divinity.\n\nLH\n_______________________________________________" } ] }, { "message_id": "", "from": { "name": "Daniel Petersen", "address": "danielottojackpetersen at gmail.com" }, "date": "2011-04-13T16:07:50+00:00", "subject": "(urth) Silk Takes A Stab At The 'Problem Of Evil'", "in_reply_to": "<4DA5B96C.3090604@gmail.com>", "reply_link": "header", "blocks": [ { "kind": "text", "depth": 0, "text": "I would say rather that God, as the first cause of all things, is the\ncause of evil as well as good, and while men are good at identifying\nlittle-e evil (the bad things that happen) we are not always good at\nidentifying big-E Evil (the form of Evil, from which all little-e\nevils are instances), but regardless, all evil/Evil is ultimately part\nof God's plan. This sounds a lot like the unknown purposes theodicy,\nwith bits of the soul-making thrown around. It's a fairly standard\ntype of theodicy: bad stuff happens but God is God and has some\nreason for it all.\n\nWell, the only way we could be talking about 'God' in any meaningful sense\n(perfectly powerful and perfectly good as you later mention) is to carefully\nqualify this notion of God as 'cause of evil'. He can't *morally* be\ne/Evil's cause without ceasing to be a 'holy' (morally perfect and just)\nGod. So he must be the 'cause' of evil indirectly through creating freewill\ncreatures with the potential to 'twist away' from him (and Evil is thereby\nconceived of as 'parasitic' in the Augustinian/Lutheran/Lewisian sense).\n There is certainly a 'soul-making' theme in Silk's theodicy, but I wonder\nif 'loving purpose' would more accurately characterise his argument than\n'unknown purpose' (going from Silk's actual words: 'His fear he is afraid\nfor our sake, not his own is that we may come to love other things more than\nwe love him... evil directs us back to the Outsider... because he is\nbetter... Reach out to him').\n\n[For convenience to any following along:\nhttp://silkandhornheresy.blogspot.com/2011/04/silk-takes-stab-at-problem-of-evil.html\n]\n\nwhat God desires, is,\nand God would not, as perfectly good, desire that which\nhe could not do.\n\nHm - 'what God desires, is' - well, not the Hebrew God in any case. The\nBible is full of God talking about his desires for his world and how most of\nthe world, including his own chosen people, are living *against*,\n*contrary*to what he desires. This is where talk of more than one\nsort of 'desire' or\n'wish' within God comes in I guess. And where concepts like divine\n'self-limitation' come in also (so that the notion of his perfect power is\npreserved even in a world where not all he wishes always comes to pass - not\nwhilst history unfolds anyway). And I really think all that fits with your\ninitial comment about God letting the world 'flow organically' better than\nwhat your describing here. It's thorny, I admit, but I suspect Wolfe (and\ncharacters like Silk) would want to let divine dynamism force us into\ninexplicable mystery rather than strict logical tidiness bring us to accept\na rather austerely static notion of deity. (And of course, mystics and\nfideists and what have you will always helpfully remind us that at least\nsome important measure of mystery in the face of divinity is hugely rational\n- we'd surely be inventing the god we could contain with our intellects!)\n\nIt's funny, I (a low-church Protestant) lean toward your Orthodox friend's\nviews rather than your Protestant friend's. I'm guessing the latter is\nrather Reformed/Calvinist? I'm more classically Arminian myself (though I\nlike to call myself 'Calminian' as I want to stay close to the Calvinist\ntradition of 'theocentricity' - and Reformed thinkers continue to be helpful\nto me), so that might partly explain it. As I say, I can't figure out where\nWolfe (or his characters) might be on this sort of spectrum.\n\nI have yet to (myself) come up with a satisfactory definition of evil\nthat is not question-begging or reduced to some sort of naturalist\nhandwaving that \"it's evil because it is evil.\"\n\nI appreciate your frankness there. It's hard enough to define (real) evil\nfrom a theistic perspective - I just find it nigh on impossible from a\nnaturalistic basis.\n\nSo to answer whether we might freely desire a result\nset in stone and that be \"enough\" for free will supposes that \"will\"\nequates to our desires, which is itself a loaded proposition: might\nwe not act contrary to our desires, or at some last moment before we\ntake a volitional action, do we always desire to engage in that\naction?\n\nI think I'm with you 100% on that formulation of the question. This is the\nkind of thing I see explored in Wolfe's characters - choices made contrary\nto desires, etc. - that mitigates against some statements that are\npotentially determinist/compatibilist. (Although I know there are\nsophisticated formulations of compatibilism that try to account for this\nseeming 'choice against desire' - a deeper desire, etc. But I'm not\nconvinced this accounts for what really looks and feels like libertarian\nchoice-making.)\n\nFor my own part, I do not think that the problem of freedom of the\nwill can be answered; how could we ever possibly determine whether our\nown actions were free or determined, let alone those of others whose\npsychology is closed to us. We are constrained to act as if our\nchoices are our own, regardless of whether we are autonomous or merely\nthe pawns of divinity.\n\nYes. But I still take that constraint as a huge hint toward the fact that\nwe really are free in some significant sense (ultimately, from my Christian\nperspective, as imago Dei beings). Also: 'autonomous or merely pawns of\ndivinity' - either a false dichotomy or causal reductionism or both. The\nChristian view wasy we're *dependent* beings (not autonomous) in *\nrelationship* to the divinity. There is real responsibility and real limits\nto that freedom. We are neither autonomous nor mere pawns. Again, this is\nthe mystery I see throughout Wolfe's writing. Something common to all\nfiction really. Wolfe's fellow Catholic writer, Flannery O'Connor, deserves\nto be quoted in this regard:\n\n'Does one's integrity ever lie in what he is not able to do? I think that\nit usually does, for free will does not mean one will, but many wills\nconflicting in one man. Freedom cannot be conceived simply. It is a\nmystery and one which a novel, even a comic novel, can only be asked to\ndeepen.' (From her 'Author's Note' to her novel *Wise Blood*.)\n\nIt's worth noting too that Silk's God is revelatory, self-disclosing, and\nthis makes ALL the difference. If God speaks to us, then we have an\nauthoritative (though not exhaustively so for our finite minds) voice on\nthese and all other matters he chooses to speak to us about (for our good,\non the Christian view, not merely our information or bafflement) - though of\ncourse, that voice has to be humbly, wisely interpreted - as you can see in\nSilk's own musings.\n\n-DOJP\n\nGood talking with you, Lane!\n\n2011/4/13 Ant?nio Pedro Marques " }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 1, "text": "Well, Lane, I must say I've seldom if ever seen such a well-wrought\npresentation of these questions, the more coming from a non-believer (we may\ndiscuss that if anyone wishes to). It's so good I'm fully quoting it below\nfully aware of the sacrifice of electricity.\n\nLane Haygood wrote (13-04-2011 15:01):\n\n Ok, Lane, right, so Silk's conception of God (the Outsider) is not\n'occasionalist' (i.e. God *directly* causes all things), but the fact\nthat\nGod 'permits' evil and forces it to serve his purposes 'however\nunwillingly'" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 3, "text": "seems to fit in with Aquinas' scheme of primary and secondary causation.\n Evil is personified by Silk as *hating* God, yet it is 'harnessed' by\nGod\nso that it 'serves' him by pointing us who get hurt by evil back to God\nfor\nour true love and goodness and purpose." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "I would say rather that God, as the first cause of all things, is the\ncause of evil as well as good, and while men are good at identifying\nlittle-e evil (the bad things that happen) we are not always good at\nidentifying big-E Evil (the form of Evil, from which all little-e\nevils are instances), but regardless, all evil/Evil is ultimately part\nof God's plan. This sounds a lot like the unknown purposes theodicy,\nwith bits of the soul-making thrown around. It's a fairly standard\ntype of theodicy: bad stuff happens but God is God and has some\nreason for it all.\n\n I think I agree with you that he's arguing that the Outsider allows his\ncreation to 'flow organically', but I just want to point out that Silk is\nstill conceiving of a God very much 'in control' in that his 'permissive\nwill' is orchestrating (if you like) all things towards his desired ends\n(which, though many are unknown as you point out, yet Silk takes a major\nknown end to be that of love between creature and Creator)." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "Sure. I didn't mean to make Silk out to be a deist. For Silk's God\n(and presumably, Wolfe's) desire and control are the same thing;\nremember, for the problem of evil to have any gravity at all God must\nbe both perfectly powerful and perfectly good. Thus, what God\ndesires, is, and God would not, as perfectly good, desire that which\nhe could not do.\n\nThe problem of evil is an interesting logical exercise, but I have\nnever been ultimately convinced of its efficacy (even as a\nnon-believer). It, like the ontological argument, comes laden with\nvalue presuppositions that are rarely made explicit, and it is filled\nwith nonsensical logical wrangling such as whether God needs to be\nable to do the impossible (create a round square, for example) to be\nperfectly powerful. I have an Orthodox friend who swears up and down\nthat perfect power need only encompass God's actions within the sphere\nof what is possible (e.g., it is not a hit against God's perfect\npotency to say that God cannot make a round square, because\nomnipotence is limited to the set of all possible actions), but a\nProtestant acquaintance that thinks that God can do the impossible\nbecause no limits of human logic apply to God. To make matters worse,\nI have yet to (myself) come up with a satisfactory definition of evil\nthat is not question-begging or reduced to some sort of naturalist\nhandwaving that \"it's evil because it is evil.\" Certainly I can point\nto actions that I think are evil (child abuse, for example) but I\nwonder if I am focusing on the end result without any reference to the\nmotivation or mindset. What about a parent that spanks their child\ntoo hard? The parent's motive is discipline, not injury, which ought\nto make a difference, even though the end result is the same." }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 3, "text": "Dan'l, I vaguely recall that too. It'd be good if we cold find the exact\nquote. I want to qualify that thought with the notion that those\nfreewill\ncreatures are still somehow genuinely significant in their choices, that\nour\npart in 'what is going to happen anyway' (or 'consenting to be governed\nby a\nKing' as David Stockhoff said) really 'makes a difference' somehow.\n However, I'm not sure whether that's Silk's or Wolfe's view. Wolfe has\nkept me guessing on this. Sometimes he sounds pretty hard determinist\n(especially, as I seem to recall, in certain passages of tBotNS). Yet\nthe\ndramas he plays out sound more libertarian. I know a compatibilist would\nsay that's just how things look but it's all causally determined even if\nour\n'choices' are 'real' based on our desires (which are determined by all\nthat\ncomes before us). Is there any room for any kind of libertarian freewill\nin\nWolfe?" }, { "kind": "quote", "depth": 2, "text": "The problem of free will is another tough nut because it comes laden\nwith lots of often-unanalyzed presuppositions, such as whether God's\nforeknowledge entails determination of the result. The same\naforementioned friends have divergent views, with one taking the\nposition that God does not need to know everything in order to be\nomniscient, if, for example, the thing to be known (the result of a\ncoin flip) is a matter of probability rather than certainty. Just\nbecause, for example, I do not know the result of a coin toss you\nwouldn't say that I am unknowledgable about coin tosses, the physics\ninvolved, or probability calculations. Even if I told you that given\nmy hand strength, the weight of the coin, and atmospheric conditions\nthe likelihood was greater that I would toss a heads, and I tossed a\ntails, you would simply say, \"well, he knew the probabilities.\" The\nother friend, predictably, takes the view that if God knows a thing,\nbecause God is atemporal and perceives all events in time\nsimultaneously, God has perfect recollective knowledge of the result\nof that coin toss. Friend 1 often rejoins that this just makes God\nthe perfect historian rather than an intellective being capable of\nfree thought on his own.\n\nFor my own part, being that time is an integral part of my cognition\nof the world around me, I cannot imagine what an atemporal being would\nthink... and yet my own views on philosophy say that a transcendent\nbeing such as God must be unlimited in both space and time, and would\nnot be saddled with the same cognitive requirements for\nintelligibility that I, a limited creature, am. But because each\nfriend takes different presuppositions as his starting point (one a\nvery continental, Hegelian view of the world, and the other a much\nmore classic Protestant view) they arrive at different answers to\nthese questions. So to answer whether we might freely desire a result\nset in stone and that be \"enough\" for free will supposes that \"will\"\nequates to our desires, which is itself a loaded proposition: might\nwe not act contrary to our desires, or at some last moment before we\ntake a volitional action, do we always desire to engage in that\naction?\n\nFor my own part, I do not think that the problem of freedom of the\nwill can be answered; how could we ever possibly determine whether our\nown actions were free or determined, let alone those of others whose\npsychology is closed to us. We are constrained to act as if our\nchoices are our own, regardless of whether we are autonomous or merely\nthe pawns of divinity.\n\nLH\n_______________________________________________" } ] } ] }