Utilitarians, Severian, and Consequences

Chris · 02 Apr 2005, 20:46 · from 2005-April.txt.gz
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From: rasputin_ at hotmail.com (Chris)
Date: Sat Apr  2 20:46:42 2005
Subject: (urth) Utilitarians, Severian, and Consequences
In-Reply-To: <424E14EA.9000309 at gmail.com>
Message-ID: <BAY102-F30E43889B51B0D9C19B112863A0 at phx.gbl>

Maru said:
>I do find that ghoulish: what if you are *wrong*?

Well isn't that just it? In any moral system where you're supposed to be 
guided by consequences (which you can't know in advance) you *always* be 
wrong. And since results aren't to be judged just on their immediate effects 
but also on indirect consequences extending indefinitely into the future, 
when can you finally settle and say "that was good" or "that was bad"? G.E. 
Moore, a rather tough-minded utilitarian, took the logical consequences of 
this and simply extended them - perhaps there never had been, or will be, an 
action which can be effectively evaluated in terms of its true utility. In 
the presence of doubt, he said, the utilitarian will simply "do the done 
thing", that is, follow the same customary rules of thumb that 
non-utilitarians use.

This isn't exactly satisfactory, because at that point there's no point to 
being a "utilitarian". What seems to be needed is some form of justification 
for doing what you *think* will produce the most utility, but this is hard 
for a traditional act utilitarian to accept because it seems to be 
rule-based rather than consequence-based. (ie, in any given case it's always 
better to *actually* produce more utility than it is to, by rule-following, 
just *try* to produce more utility). It's not impossible to build a system 
that deals with it, but you would probably find such systems a little more 
arcane than what you're thinking of.

>Think of all the people you just brutally slaughtered,

This isn't an objection that's really open to the utilitarian, because while 
it's true that if you're wrong you've just caused a great deal of harm, on 
the other hand if you abstain from acting and you're wrong about that, you 
have just condemned an even larger number of people who need transplants to 
death.

There is no inherent virtue in refusing to act for a utilitarian; the 
results of inaction are just as substantial as the results of action. But 
the next one you mention *is* commonly used:

>and of the breakdown in public order that engenders and all the other side 
>effects of it...  I think it tips the scale towards, y'know, not doing that 
>in real life

This is a reasonable objection, although I'd note that if you really start 
applying this standard, then the utilitarian starts "doing the done thing" 
more and more... utilitarianism becomes less distinct because its proponent 
is constrained from actually acting according to its dictates.

Also, it is a bit disconcerting to try and advance any ethic which, if it 
were followed, would cause widespread breakdown of laws and considerable 
social harm. Side question: if you could create an entirely utilitarian 
society, what would be its laws? How would punishments and rewards be 
allotted? [I don't think the list would appreciate an actual exploration of 
this question, though.]

>yeah. But of course, such an ideal universe we do not live in, and is but 
>an academic point.

If it requires an ideal universe for you to act according to your ethic, 
then it's not a very practical ethic.

Severian's case is interesting in that we're stipulating that he knows with 
100% certainty the *immediate* results of his action, and some of the 
secondary/indirect results. We have somewhat discussed what conclusions a 
person who tried to judge consequences would reach in his position. You have 
an immediate loss of almost all animal life on the planet, with a later 
rebirth (and future generations that seem to turn out pretty well). If he 
fails to act then people live out their lives for generations, eventually 
most of those remaining get evacuated to other worlds which may or may not 
be just as good as Ushas (no basis for comparison here). This calculus, I 
think, tends to weigh heavily against Sev's action *unless* you attach some 
very heavy importance to "human life on Ushas" as opposed to "human life on 
any other planet". I think it's reasonable to say that Severian, in some 
slightly confusing way, does count life on Ushas to be somehow more 
significant... but I also have the general feeling that Sev *didn't* think 
it out and weigh the consequences, he just acted decisively.

>We strive for plans maximizing good. Severian's actions, while having 
>horrible intermediate results, results in greater good, both in theory
>and in practice (the Green man remember); we applaude.

The Green man, or something as good as the Green Man, could have arisen 
elsewhere in one of the other worlds humanity was spread across. But this is 
pretty much implicit in the above.

>Because what you do with things has different moral values depending on 
>whose you think they are (ex. moving a TV from house to house depends on 
>just who you think owns it, one is helpful and the other is theft.). And 
>I'm pretty sure the Autarch is the 'legal' ruler of Urth, from all the 
>other planets views anyway. And if the Hierodules didn't think so as well, 
>why would a petty ruler of one little kingdom have been chosen as Epitome 
>mm?  The Autarch as legitmate ruler of Urth (but not de facto) was 
>certainly the impression I got. Anyone care to weigh in?

I think this starts to wade into the more murky, symbolic areas of the text. 
Taken literally, though, I can't really think of a way in which we would 
assent that it would be morally laudable for George W. to kill us all 
because he's president. If we imagine him as king, tyrant, or whatever else, 
it doesn't really change our judgment of such an act.

Now if you're saying that if we had been born in such a tyranny we might 
judge differently, well, perhaps, but perhaps not. Would such a judgment be 
just as valid as the one we make now in our more "enlightened" age? We're 
not free to take this out unless we're moral relativists, and that's not a 
position anyone here has endorsed.

>>As a side note with talk of fascism running rampant in the list I find 
>>myself reflecting that tyranny and fascism were not aspects that I 
>>strongly associated with Autarchy when I first read the books. My first 
>>impression, even at this point, when someone calls Severian "the Autarch" 
>>is to think: self-ruled, self-ruler. Only by extension do I reach an idea 
>>of governing others.
>>
>"To rule others, first rule yourself" ?

Or perhaps, like Talos's play, Urth is full of just a few people who wear 
different masks and play different roles as their parts require... then Sev 
might literally just be ruling himself. But that's another of those murky 
metaphysical tales.
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