Utilitarians, Severian, and Consequences

maru · 07 Apr 2005, 19:14 · from 2005-April.txt.gz
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From: marudubshinki at gmail.com (maru)
Date: Thu Apr  7 19:14:09 2005
Subject: (urth) Utilitarians, Severian, and Consequences
In-Reply-To: <BAY102-F30E43889B51B0D9C19B112863A0 at phx.gbl>
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Message-ID: <4255E8E9.5000408 at gmail.com>

Chris wrote:

> Maru said:
>
>> I do find that ghoulish: what if you are *wrong*?
>
>
> Well isn't that just it? In any moral system where you're supposed to 
> be guided by consequences (which you can't know in advance) you 
> *always* be wrong. And since results aren't to be judged just on their 
> immediate effects but also on indirect consequences extending 
> indefinitely into the future, when can you finally settle and say 
> "that was good" or "that was bad"? G.E. Moore, a rather tough-minded 
> utilitarian, took the logical consequences of this and simply extended 
> them - perhaps there never had been, or will be, an action which can 
> be effectively evaluated in terms of its true utility. In the presence 
> of doubt, he said, the utilitarian will simply "do the done thing", 
> that is, follow the same customary rules of thumb that 
> non-utilitarians use.
>
> This isn't exactly satisfactory, because at that point there's no 
> point to being a "utilitarian". What seems to be needed is some form 
> of justification for doing what you *think* will produce the most 
> utility, but this is hard for a traditional act utilitarian to accept 
> because it seems to be rule-based rather than consequence-based. (ie, 
> in any given case it's always better to *actually* produce more 
> utility than it is to, by rule-following, just *try* to produce more 
> utility). It's not impossible to build a system that deals with it, 
> but you would probably find such systems a little more arcane than 
> what you're thinking of.
>
>> Think of all the people you just brutally slaughtered,
>
>
> This isn't an objection that's really open to the utilitarian, because 
> while it's true that if you're wrong you've just caused a great deal 
> of harm, on the other hand if you abstain from acting and you're wrong 
> about that, you have just condemned an even larger number of people 
> who need transplants to death.
>
> There is no inherent virtue in refusing to act for a utilitarian; the 
> results of inaction are just as substantial as the results of action. 
> But the next one you mention *is* commonly used:
>
>> and of the breakdown in public order that engenders and all the other 
>> side effects of it...  I think it tips the scale towards, y'know, not 
>> doing that in real life
>
>
> This is a reasonable objection, although I'd note that if you really 
> start applying this standard, then the utilitarian starts "doing the 
> done thing" more and more... utilitarianism becomes less distinct 
> because its proponent is constrained from actually acting according to 
> its dictates.
>
> Also, it is a bit disconcerting to try and advance any ethic which, if 
> it were followed, would cause widespread breakdown of laws and 
> considerable social harm. Side question: if you could create an 
> entirely utilitarian society, what would be its laws? How would 
> punishments and rewards be allotted? [I don't think the list would 
> appreciate an actual exploration of this question, though.]
>
>> yeah. But of course, such an ideal universe we do not live in, and is 
>> but an academic point.
>
>
> If it requires an ideal universe for you to act according to your 
> ethic, then it's not a very practical ethic.
>
> Severian's case is interesting in that we're stipulating that he knows 
> with 100% certainty the *immediate* results of his action, and some of 
> the secondary/indirect results. We have somewhat discussed what 
> conclusions a person who tried to judge consequences would reach in 
> his position. You have an immediate loss of almost all animal life on 
> the planet, with a later rebirth (and future generations that seem to 
> turn out pretty well). If he fails to act then people live out their 
> lives for generations, eventually most of those remaining get 
> evacuated to other worlds which may or may not be just as good as 
> Ushas (no basis for comparison here). This calculus, I think, tends to 
> weigh heavily against Sev's action *unless* you attach some very heavy 
> importance to "human life on Ushas" as opposed to "human life on any 
> other planet". I think it's reasonable to say that Severian, in some 
> slightly confusing way, does count life on Ushas to be somehow more 
> significant... but I also have the general feeling that Sev *didn't* 
> think it out and weigh the consequences, he just acted decisively.
>
>> We strive for plans maximizing good. Severian's actions, while having 
>> horrible intermediate results, results in greater good, both in theory
>> and in practice (the Green man remember); we applaude.
>
>
> The Green man, or something as good as the Green Man, could have 
> arisen elsewhere in one of the other worlds humanity was spread 
> across. But this is pretty much implicit in the above.
>
>> Because what you do with things has different moral values depending 
>> on whose you think they are (ex. moving a TV from house to house 
>> depends on just who you think owns it, one is helpful and the other 
>> is theft.). And I'm pretty sure the Autarch is the 'legal' ruler of 
>> Urth, from all the other planets views anyway. And if the Hierodules 
>> didn't think so as well, why would a petty ruler of one little 
>> kingdom have been chosen as Epitome mm?  The Autarch as legitmate 
>> ruler of Urth (but not de facto) was certainly the impression I got. 
>> Anyone care to weigh in?
>
>
> I think this starts to wade into the more murky, symbolic areas of the 
> text. Taken literally, though, I can't really think of a way in which 
> we would assent that it would be morally laudable for George W. to 
> kill us all because he's president. If we imagine him as king, tyrant, 
> or whatever else, it doesn't really change our judgment of such an act.
>
> Now if you're saying that if we had been born in such a tyranny we 
> might judge differently, well, perhaps, but perhaps not. Would such a 
> judgment be just as valid as the one we make now in our more 
> "enlightened" age? We're not free to take this out unless we're moral 
> relativists, and that's not a position anyone here has endorsed.
>
We are discussing how Severian feels no problem bringing on the New Sun 
, despite, as another poster put it, considerable pressure not to; I 
suggested that in addition to  the suggestion that Sev is essentially 
duped, he regards himself as the sole legitimate ruler of Urth-  he 
rather blatantly makes that clear, both with Typhon, and during UOTNS,  
esp. before the court of Tzadkiel the Just.
I never said that makes it right.
AUTARCH: Here I sit as though the lord of a hundred worlds. Yet not 
master even of this.

>>> As a side note with talk of fascism running rampant in the list I 
>>> find myself reflecting that tyranny and fascism were not aspects 
>>> that I strongly associated with Autarchy when I first read the 
>>> books. My first impression, even at this point, when someone calls 
>>> Severian "the Autarch" is to think: self-ruled, self-ruler. Only by 
>>> extension do I reach an idea of governing others.
>>>
>> "To rule others, first rule yourself" ?
>
>
> Or perhaps, like Talos's play, Urth is full of just a few people who 
> wear different masks and play different roles as their parts 
> require... then Sev might literally just be ruling himself. But that's 
> another of those murky metaphysical tales.

It is a curiousity of the play that it dwells at length on the 
supplanation of the old by the new, which will be stronger and more 
beautiful.  Perhaps it is merely a conceit of mine, but methinks that is 
a rare theme- last I saw it was in Greek myth, and Keats' poetic 
treatises there of.
Murkiest in the play is the ending.  Severian in UOTNS is not Severian 
in the play- but Nod?  Does Jahi mean one of the two sleeping goddesses?

~Maru
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